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Executive Summary 
 
The role of ambulance services within the NHS is undergoing significant change following 
publication of Taking Healthcare to the Patient: Transforming Ambulance Services (DH 2005). The 
report sets out over seventy recommendations, which over the next five years will result in 
a greater emphasis on the provision of health services within the primary care setting. The 
North West Ambulance Service was formed in July 2006 and is the result of a merger of 
four Ambulance Trusts within the North West of England. It is perceived that the merger 
process, to form a larger Trust, will bring greater strategic capacity and improved 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness. The new organisation brings together different 
cultures, structures and ways of working including different ways for managing adverse 
incidents and any learning or management of knowledge thereafter. It is of strategic 
importance that the new organisation has the ability to capture knowledge and learn, thus 
improving overall organisational effectiveness. It is also important that the organisation 
uses this opportunity to ensure that new structures and systems support the notion of 
knowledge management and organisational learning.  
 
The objectives of the study were; to investigate the organisation’s ability to recognise, and 
record adverse incidents, investigate development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation, investigate the organisation’s implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to improve organisational performance and to make 
proposals/recommendations that will improve organisational learning and knowledge 
management in the context of the ambulance service. 
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A case study design was utilised consisting of; secondary data from the 2006 NHS Staff 
Survey, a self-completion questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. 
  
The organisation does not exhibit all the qualities of a learning organisation. There are 
effective systems to gather information in relation to adverse incidents but the transfer of 
the information within the organisation is often delayed and not adequately shared or used.  
The hierarchical structure and the lack of effective leadership within the operational 
environment do not support team working and learning. Despite evidence of the Trust 
supporting an open and fair culture there is evidence of a perceived blame culture. As a 
result, incident reporting is primarily driven by a culture of self preservation. There is 
evidence of single loop learning occurring at an individual level, although even this is 
significantly limited due to operational work pressures. More systematic learning and 
knowledge development is evident when significant incidents occur, although the inability 
to communicate information back to staff effectively is a limiting factor. There is also a lack 
of ability for staff to communicate other types of information upwards within the 
organisation.  
 
Recommendations include; a full review of the operational management structure and 
capacity within the operational workforce, purchasing of an electronic incident reporting 
system, development of an Organisational Learning Strategy and Policy, a review of 
specific human resource policies and establishment of an Incident Review Forum.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 About the author 
The author is employed as the Clinical Governance Manager for the Greater Manchester 
Area by the North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust (NWAS or the ‘Trust’).  The role 
currently functions within the Medical Directorate and includes the management of a small 
team (see appendix 1), reporting to the General Manager of Healthcare Governance.  
 
The two main aspects of the role are: 
 
? Reviewing and developing clinical services delivered by the Trust, and 
? Developing methods of measuring and assuring the quality of patient care delivered. 
 
Much of the role is involved with change management and directly influenced by national 
initiatives and therefore organisational priorities.  
 
1.2 The area under investigation 
 
The problem area to be investigated is the management of knowledge within the 
organisation and how this supports organisational learning. Particular emphasis will be on 
the management of knowledge from adverse incidents such as near misses, clinical and 
non-clinical incidents. Many of these are managed by different departments across the 
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Trust and at different levels. The outcomes and learning from these incidents often occurs 
at an individual level but not at a Trust-wide level. 
 
The geographical area that the Trust serves and the ‘command and control’ management 
style within the operational environment are not conducive to the features of a learning 
organisation that is required to support organisational learning. Ambulance staff tend to 
work in pairs with limited opportunity to function as collective teams or to interact with 
other staff. 
  
1.3 National Context 
The provision of pre-hospital care by ambulance staff is one of the youngest roles within 
the NHS and one of the fastest developing. Nationally, ambulance services are being seen 
as key in redesigning the way patients access and use the NHS, and how care is delivered. 
The main driver for this is Taking Healthcare to the Patient: Transforming Ambulance Services (DH 
2005).  The vision within the report includes developing an increasing range of mobile 
healthcare and delivering services within primary care. This is also underpinned by 
recommendations to develop the workforce by redesigning the education pathways and by 
developing extended clinical roles such as Emergency Care Practitioners (ECPs).  
 
The report sets out seventy recommendations which, over a period of five years, aim to 
create conditions whereby ambulance services are; 
 
“Transformed from a service focusing primarily on resuscitation, trauma and acute care towards 
becoming a mobile health resource for the whole NHS.” (DH 2005) 
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In 2000, the Department of Health published An Organisation with a Memory (DH 2000), a 
report on learning from adverse events in the NHS. The report identified three key areas 
where the NHS falls short of being a learning organisation: 
 
? There is too often a ‘blame’ culture.  
? No account is taken of near misses. 
? There is little culture of self-appraisal. 
 
The recommendations of the report included; encouraging a reporting and questioning 
culture in the NHS, encouraging staff to look critically at their own actions and those of 
their teams and to make better use of existing sources of information on adverse events.  
 
“Organisational learning has been identified as a central concern for a modernised NHS. 
Continuing professional development has an important role to play in improving learning but there 
is also a need to pay more attention to collective (organisational) learning.” (Nutley and Davies 
2001 p 35) 
 
Taking Healthcare to the Patient supports this view within the context of ambulance 
services, with one of the key recommendations being: 
 
“Ambulance managers need to continue to focus on their own development as professional 
healthcare managers….Leadership needs to focus more fully on cross-organisational team work, 
building relationships and coaching and supporting staff to improve patient care.” (DH 2005 
p60) 
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Generally, within health care organisations the rapid evolution of new techniques creates 
new possibilities for change of organisation, work flow and decision making. Demands for 
higher quality services and the evolution of a customer consumer perspective are also an 
influencing factor (Nikula 1999). 
 
1.4 Local Context 
The North West Ambulance Service was formed in July 2006. It is the result of a merger of 
four ambulance services (Cumbria, Lancashire, Greater Manchester and Mersey Regional). 
Despite the formal existence of the new organisation since July, the merger process is still 
ongoing with many of the lower structures yet to be developed or agreed. This change is 
also the result of Taking Healthcare to the Patient: Transforming Ambulance Services (DH 2005). 
Within the report was a recommendation that thirty one ambulance services in England 
were reduced to eleven and that their new boundaries should be in line with the Strategic 
Health Authorities (SHA). The perception is that the increase in organisational size will 
build strategic capacity and therefore improve organisational efficiency and effectiveness 
(DH 2005). The new organisation employs approximately 4500 staff, providing services 
across a geographically diverse area of 5,500 square miles to nearly seven million people.  
 
Due to the size of the new organisation it has been split into three ‘areas’ (Cumbria & 
Lancashire, Manchester and Mersey & Cheshire). These are led by an Area Director and an 
Area Committee. The purpose of these is to ensure that the new organisation is locally 
responsive – reflecting current commissioning arrangements, local knowledge and 
capabilities (NWAT 2006).  
 
4 
The new Chief Executive has also produced a vision statement for the new Trust that 
refers to the development of integrated service programmes and with alternative pathways 
of care being developed. All of which is underpinned by a commitment to develop the 
workforce modernisation programme for clinical staff to ensure a highly competent and 
committed workforce (Burnside 2006). 
 
While the national context suggests huge changes in the way ambulance services operate 
and deliver services over the next five years, the merger of four ambulance services 
presents a variety of complex issues in the shorter term. These include: 
 
? Different cultures 
? Different management styles and structures 
? Variations in operational practice and management 
? Different operating environments – rural and urban 
? Variations in clinical practice and skills 
 
It is unclear yet how many, if any, of these issues will be managed and resolved. What is 
clear is that they will be much more difficult to achieve than some of the areas discussed 
within the national context. 
 
1.5 Strategic significance of the area under investigation 
The new organisation brings together different cultures, structures and ways of working; 
there are different policies and procedures for managing adverse incidents and any 
subsequent learning or management of knowledge thereafter. 
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It is of strategic importance that the new organisation, as a whole, has the ability to capture 
this knowledge and learn from it, thus improving overall organisational effectiveness. It is 
also important that the organisation uses this opportunity to ensure that new structures and 
systems support the notion of knowledge management and organisational learning. 
 
1.6 Research Question and Objectives 
How can the organisation capture information more efficiently from adverse incidents and; 
how can this information be used to generate new knowledge that supports organisational 
learning? 
 
Research Objectives 
1. To investigate the organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record adverse 
incidents. 
2. To investigate development of new knowledge and learning from information 
within the organisation. 
3. To investigate the organisation’s implementation of new learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational performance. 
4. To make proposals/recommendations that will improve organisational learning and 
knowledge management in the context of the ambulance service and; propose how 
the model or concept could be improved as an analytical tool. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
- Concepts relating to organisational learning and knowledge 
management. 
 
 
2.1 History 
 
The concept of organisational learning being a key process in supporting change and 
improving organisational performance can be traced back to the 1960s, with research being 
undertaken by;  Cyert and March (1963) Argyris (1964), Cangelosi and Dill (1965).  Cyert 
and March’s (1963) work is considered to be the foundation of organisational learning; that 
organisations could learn independently of the people within it (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 
2005).  Argyris and Schon (1978) developed the concepts of single and double loop 
learning, based on the detection and correction of error and focused more on an 
organisation’s capability to engage in learning. Further contributions in the 1980s 
(Hedberg, 1981; Shrivastava, 1983; Daft and Weick, 1984 and Fiol and Lyles, 1985) helped 
to define the terminology and provide a greater understanding of the distinction between 
organisational learning and unlearning.  These theories and concepts are known as the 
technical view (Easterby-Smith and Araujo 1999), which are based on individual learning 
theory and the development of mental models or ‘maps’ (Elkjaer 1999).  
 
This view assumes that organisational learning is about the effective management of 
information by an organisation, helping them to adapt to the external environment (Elkjaer 
2005). March (1991), Huber (1991), Epple et al(1991) and Simon (1991) all published 
highly influential articles (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2005) in Organization Science that further 
developed this view. It was also assumed that people themselves were often obstacles to 
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the effective management of information and that individuals or organisations do not 
always behave according to rational calculations, particularly where political agendas take 
precedence (Easterby-Smith and Araujo 1999). Senge’s (1990) seminal book The Learning 
Organisation adopted a systems perspective, emphasising the need for individuals to 
develop; systems thinking, a desire to learn and mental models that were shaped to the 
organisations vision. 
 
Throughout the 1990s organisational learning gained much wider recognition with 
Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) attributing this to two factors; scholars from a variety of 
backgrounds realising that the ability of organisations to learn faster or better was key to 
business success, and that consultants and companies realised the commercial benefits of 
organisational learning. 
 
 
2.2 Organisational Learning as a Social Process 
An alternate view that also developed during the 1990s suggested that organisational 
learning was a social process based on people making sense of their experiences at work 
(Easterby-Smith and Araujo 1999).  Brown and Duguid (1991) and Orr (1990) viewed 
organisational learning as a form of social construction, where informal exchanges of 
information through social interaction (such as story-telling and narration) enabled 
individuals to learn and perform more effectively.  Central to this view was that knowledge 
existed not on paper or within individuals but within a ‘community’ as a whole. Probst and 
Buchel (1997 p14) also define organisational learning as ‘learning by a social system that 
pursues the creation of social capital’. Organisational learning as a social process is also 
seen to overcome some of the limitations of the technical view, by recognising that no 
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matter how well organisations manage information, it is meaningless until people determine 
what it means (Easterby-Smith and Araujo 1999).   
 
 
2.3 Individual and Collective Learning 
‘Organisational learning’ is said to concern the processes of individual and collective 
learning - both within and between organisations (Prange 1999). Tsang (1997) also 
supports this view, adding that it is largely concerned with the academic study of the 
learning processes of and within organisations –understanding and reviewing what is taking 
place.  Despite this, organisational learning remains a little-understood concept, perhaps 
because many of the definitions provided are quite complex, abstract and diverse. Prange 
(1999 p24) refers to an ‘organisational learning jungle, which is becoming progressively 
dense and impenetrable’. Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) state that this is a result of the 
work of a wide variety of scholars that have studied organisational learning such as; 
business strategists, economists and sociologists. 
 
Fiol and Lyles (1985 p29) define learning as ‘the process of improving actions through 
better knowledge and understanding’. However, this definition does not emphasise that 
organisational learning is a collective learning process. Cyert & March (1963) state 
individuals are the ‘agents’ of organizational learning. Although organisational learning is 
accomplished by individuals, it would be a mistake to conclude that organizational learning 
is nothing but the cumulative result of their members’ learning (Hedberg, 1981). Wang and 
Ahmed (2003 p 9) also state; ‘individual learning has a significant impact on the concept 
and practices of organisational learning’ and that; ‘learning starts with the individual’. 
However, individual learning does not necessarily lead to organisational learning (Ikehara 
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1999). Organisational learning should therefore be the result of individuals deliberately 
interacting through learning from experience (Kolb, 1984; Honey and Mumford, 1992). 
 
 
2.4 The link between Organisational Learning & Knowledge 
Management 
Dodgson (1993 p377) describes organisational learning as ‘the way firms build, supplement, 
and organize knowledge and routines around their activities and within their cultures and 
adapt and develop organizational efficiency by improving the broad skills of their 
workforces’. This definition is more reflective of the processes involved, with a greater 
emphasis on collective knowledge acquisition and the value of the workforce. It also 
recognises that culture has an important part to play in learning and establishes a clear link 
with improving organisational performance. This is reinforced by Huber (1991) who claims 
the processes by which knowledge is acquired, shared, commonly understood, and stored 
contribute to organisational learning. Lyles (1988) also refers to organisational learning as 
the changes in the state of knowledge.  
 
 
2.5 Knowledge Management 
The concept of knowledge management is viewed as a more recent development in 
management (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2005 and Davenport and Prusak 2000). However, 
Hansen et al (1999) contends organisations have always used knowledge management, just 
not in a deliberate or systematic way. During the 1990s knowledge management became 
popularised through the publication of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) “The Knowledge 
Creating Company” and the development of information technology and the internet - to 
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provide sophisticated knowledge management tools (Vera and Crossan 2005).  Despite its 
popularity there is still a degree of confusion when trying to define knowledge 
management. (Cong and Pandya, 2003; Vera and Grossan, 2005). A summary of 
knowledge management definitions is provided in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of knowledge management 
Van der Spek and Spijkervet 
(1997 p43) 
The explicit control and management of knowledge within an 
organization aimed at achieving the company’s objectives. 
O’Leary (1998 p34) The formal management of knowledge for facilitating creation, access, and reuse of knowledge, typically using advanced technology. 
Bassi (1999 p424) The process of creating, capturing and using knowledge to enhance organizational performance. 
Liebowitz and Wilcox (1997 pi) The ability of organizations to manage, store, value and distribute knowledge.  
Cong and Pandya (2003 p27) 
An ability of an organisation to use its collective knowledge through 
a process of knowledge generation, sharing and exploitation enabled 
by technology to achieve its objectives. 
 
Scarborough and Swan (2005) identify three themes within knowledge management 
literature; performance improvement, capturing and managing knowledge as a strategic 
resource, and the processing and storage of knowledge.  Vera and Grossan (2005) 
summarise knowledge management as ‘managed learning’, with an assumption that it will 
have a positive impact on performance. Knowledge management concepts and theories are 
prescriptive in terms of what organisations should do to manage knowledge (Vera and 
Grossan 2005) and follow a similar technical view of organisational learning (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles 2005). Conversely, organisational knowledge is viewed as a resource that 
provides competitive advantage and the study of it is concerned with the processes of how 
knowledge is created, developed, shared and transferred (Argote and Ingram, 2000; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Pisano, 1994; Szulanski, 1996). Organisational knowledge is 
stored partly in individuals in the form of skills, experience and personal capability, and 
partly into the organisation, in the form of rules, regulations and standards (Weick and 
Roberts 1993).  
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2.6 Types of Knowledge 
Knowledge can be classed as two types; tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge (Polyani 
1966). Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that people have in their minds, which is personal 
and difficult to formalise or share with others. It also provides context for people and is 
made up of cognitive and technical aspects (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The cognitive 
aspect consists of what Johnson-Laird (1983) calls ‘mental models’ that people develop of 
the world and their experiences – an individual’s images of reality and visions for the future 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The technical aspect is concerned with the specific skills and 
crafts that have been developed (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).  Explicit knowledge is more 
formal and systematic, which can be communicated easily. This type of knowledge tends to 
be more objective and specific, relating to past events (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
Hansen et al (1999) propose similar classifications of knowledge when discussing strategies 
for its management: a codification strategy and a personalisation approach. Codification 
strategies tend to be computer centred; knowledge (explicit) is codified and stored in 
databases and then accessed and used by authorised personnel. In a personalisation 
approach the knowledge (tacit) is more closely linked with individuals and the sharing of 
knowledge through person to person communication.  Whether strategies of codification 
or personalisation are used, or a mix of both, depends on a variety of factors (Hansen et al 
1999). 
 
However, Cook and Brown (1999) contend that tacit and explicit knowledge are not 
sufficient to fully understand the concept of knowledge. They suggest that the notion of 
knowing should be added to reflect what somebody actually knows. While tacit and explicit 
knowledge is possessed by people, knowing is about ‘practice’ and interacting with the 
social and physical world. Knowledge is mostly concerned with cognitive functions such as 
skills and facts (know what), while knowing is more concerned with behavioural – 
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knowledge as action (know how) (Vera and Grossan 2005). This additional aspect to 
knowledge is useful since it places more emphasis on people actually putting knowledge 
into practice rather than just its creation, storage and transfer. Brown and Duguid (1998) 
also believe that the core competency of organisations requires the knowing (know how) to 
put knowledge (know what) into practice. Cook and Brown (1999) also put the elements of 
knowledge and knowing into a learning context by suggesting they are the content of 
learning processes; that learning is a change in knowledge and knowing, resulting in 
changes to people’s cognition and behaviour.   
 
 
2.7 The use of Knowledge 
A more important consideration of organisational learning is how the knowledge is then 
used. Nutley and Davis (2001 p36) suggest ‘the management of past and present 
knowledge is an important part of organisational learning’.  Organisational learning is also 
concerned with the building and adaptation of knowledge (Stonehouse and Pemberton 
1999), with one of the most important roles being to confirm that individual learning leads 
to organisational knowledge (Pemberton and Stonehouse 2000). Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
(1995) knowledge creation model provides an understanding of the impact of 
organisational learning on knowledge management, explaining the process of knowledge 
transfer between individual, group, organisational and inter-organisational levels.  However, 
Wang and Ahmed (2003 p 12) state, ‘ part of knowledge between an organisation and 
individuals is complementary and part of it incongruent to each other’s belief systems’. 
Alder et al (1999) suggest it is management’s role to create a learning environment that 
supports the interaction of the organisation and individuals to share and build knowledge. 
This requires organisations to have systems or processes in place to use the acquired 
knowledge to change or develop.  ‘Organisations that deliberately seek to develop 
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organisational learning are often referred to as learning organisations’ (Nutley and Davies 
2001 p36). Dodgson (1993 p14) defines a learning organisation as; ‘One which purposefully 
constructs structures and strategies so as to maximise organizational learning’. The concept 
of learning organisations is also seen as key to organisations being able to cope with 
continuous change (Dixon 1994), and becoming more adaptable and responsive to change 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1989; Senge, 1990). This is particularly relevant within 
the healthcare sector. Ranade (1997) states that managing in and for uncertainty will remain 
a reality in the health service, which will require enhanced capacity for social learning. 
 
 
2.8 Learning Organisations 
According to Senge, a learning organisation is one in which people continually expand their 
capacity to create the results they truly desire and learn how to learn and perform well 
together (1990). This definition is highly dependant on the culture within an organisation 
and individuals being motivated to learn.  Garvin (1993 p.80) defines a learning 
organisation as one that creates, acquires and transfers knowledge and modifies its 
behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights. This definition is more closely linked to 
Dodgson’s (1993) view of organisational learning.  
 
From this discussion it can be summarised that: 
? Organisational learning and knowledge management are clearly linked. 
? The process of learning is linked to the knowledge creation process. 
? Knowing is a key consideration for ensuring knowledge is put into action. 
? For organisational learning to occur the organisation needs to develop structures 
and systems that encourage individual learning but also support the social learning 
process and therefore the subsequent creation, sharing and capturing of knowledge. 
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? The organisation needs to have systems in place to store and use acquired 
knowledge as a core competency, so that it supports its adaptation, change and 
development. 
 
 
2.9 Models for Learning Organisations 
Argyris and Schon (1978) provide a model for learning organisations, based on single and 
double loop learning. Senge (1990) refers to these as ‘learning routines’. Senge (1990) also 
suggests that the types of learning routines used by organisations can be distinguished as 
adaptive and generative learning. Figure 1 illustrates these: 
 
Single-loop Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Double-loop Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1   = the process of sensing, scanning, and monitoring the environment 
Step 2   = the comparison of this information against operating norms 
Step 2a  = the process of questioning whether operating norms are appropriate 
Step 3   = the process of initiating appropriate action 
Step 
1
Step 
2
Step 
3
Step 
2a
Step 
1
Step 
2
Step 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Single and double-loop learning Argyris and Schon (1978) 
Source: Morgan (1997) 
 
Single-loop (adaptive) learning refers to the ability to detect and correct errors in relation to 
pre-set norms or standards. The norms or standards could be derived form organisational 
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policy, standards or objectives. According to Dodgson (1993), adaptive learning can add to 
an organisation’s knowledge base or routines without altering the fundamental nature of 
the organisation’s activities. It involves incremental change, narrowing the gap between 
desired and actual conditions. Single-loop learning is the most prevalent form of learning in 
organisations (Iles and Sutherland 2001). Senge (1990) refers to this type of learning as 
‘coping’. 
 
Double-loop (generative) learning refers not only to the ability to detect and correct errors, 
but also to question the norms or standards. Dodgson (1993) states that this type of 
learning can change an organisation’s knowledge base, its routines or activities. This type of 
learning can lead to transformational change (Iles and Sutherland 2001). 
 
Both single and double-loop learning however, could be considered as focussing too 
heavily on problem based learning, developing a reactive learning culture that may not be 
proactive. The models assume, and are dependant on, organisations having an open and 
blame free culture where individuals feel confident to report errors or question the norms. 
It has already been established that many NHS organisations do not have a culture that 
encourages the reporting of incidents (DH 2000). The models do not reflect the complexity 
of larger organisations and make the assumption that individual processes within an 
organisation can be mapped against these. 
 
There is also the issue of who or what controls the process and at what levels these types 
of learning should occur in an organisation The objective of double-loop learning is to 
challenge the norms and question ‘why’. If not managed or controlled effectively this type 
of learning could lead to disharmony and disorganisation, resulting in failure to achieve 
organisational goals. As discussed earlier, a key part of organisational learning is an 
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improvement in organisational performance or efficiency. Therefore double-loop learning 
would need to occur within defined parameters, which may change according to levels 
within an organisation.  
 
There is also an assumption that organisations should aspire to move from single to 
double-loop learning. This is perhaps not entirely true in the real world since there are 
probably many core, routine tasks or functions within organisations that rely on single-loop 
learning to ensure they are completed as efficiently as possible. It could also be argued that 
single-loop learning is required to embed the results of double-loop learning, providing 
periods of stability to develop new routines and un-learn old routines. There is probably a 
careful balance to be achieved in relation to the two levels of learning, ensuring that the 
organisation does not become ‘disorganised’, while all individuals are able and willing to 
contribute and are not resistant to change.   
 
A fundamental weakness in this model is its focus on individual learning. There is no 
explanation offered as to how individual learning is linked or leads to organisational 
learning. Many organisational learning theories or models are focused on the activities of 
individuals of organisations, which leads to ‘individual action bias’ (Huysman 1999). These 
tend to over look the role played by structural conditions, institutional forces, history, 
cultures and organisational norms and values.  
 
Another concept is that of organisational learning being a continuous process (Easterby-
Smith and Araujo 1999). The DH (2000) adapted a model used by British Petroleum in 
relation to knowledge management (see figure 2). 
17 
 
Monitor service
delivery
Lessons learned
Identify potential
and actual riskImplement changes
Make changes to
policy and practice
Awareness of
systems
Analysis
Distill and
validate
Prioritise;
disseminate, train
Embed and sustain
changes
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Learning Cycle (DH 2000)  
 
The process is intended to be used, in relation to adverse incidents, either before, during or 
after the event. The first half of the cycle is concerned with monitoring and developing 
solutions or learning opportunities, while the second half focuses on putting the learning 
into practice. This is similar to Dixon’s (1994) model that includes four stages; the 
generation of information about internal and external performance, a sustained effort to 
integrate the information into the organisational context, a collective attempt to interpret 
information through improved interaction and reduced hierarchy, and encouragement for 
individuals and groups to take appropriate action on the basis of the shared understanding 
of the problems to be addressed. However, the DH model differs in that it seems to be a 
closed system that focuses primarily on service delivery. It does not show how new 
information or knowledge is captured from external sources or even from internal sources 
such as staff feedback or suggestions. The cycle also suggests that change may only come 
about as a result of potential or actual risks. The term ‘monitor service delivery’ could also 
be perceived as a term that is exclusive to management. The learning element of the cycle 
does recognise the need for individuals and organisations to understand the experiences for 
true learning to occur. Similar to Argyris and Schon’s (1978) concept there is probably a 
tendency to be more reactive, focusing on the ‘here and now’ rather than monitoring for 
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wider environmental changes. The model is also uni-directional and similar to their single 
loop model; suffering from similar limitations. There is little acknowledgement of the social 
processes involved in developing tacit knowledge. Similarly the cycle does not reflect the 
complexities of change, with particular focus on making changes to explicit knowledge 
such as policy and practice.       
 
 
2.10 Knowledge Creation 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose a model based on the theory of knowledge creation. 
Their view is that organisational learning occurs from a process in which individual (tacit) 
knowledge is transferred and shared upwardly to an organisational level. The model is 
made up of four different modes of knowledge conversion that create a spiral effect, 
converting from tacit to explicit to tacit knowledge (see table 2 below). The process is a 
‘continuous and dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge’ (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995 p 70). 
   
Table 2: Four Modes of Knowledge Conversion (adapted from Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) 
Mode Knowledge Conversion 
Content of knowledge 
created 
Socialisation Tacit to tacit knowledge 
Knowledge is transferred through interactions between 
individuals, which may be in an informal manner. 
Mental models or actual skill may be shared, even 
without the use of language. 
Sympathized learning 
Externalisation 
Tacit 
knowledge to 
explicit 
knowledge 
Tacit knowledge is communicated as ‘explicit concepts’ 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995 p 64). This may be in the 
form of writing or language, often using metaphors 
(p64).  
Conceptual knowledge 
Combination 
Explicit to 
explicit 
knowledge 
The concepts or models are developed through 
interaction with other colleagues or individuals. 
Knowledge is shared, discussed and then combined to 
from new knowledge. This may be done through 
conversations, meetings, emails or networks. 
Systemic knowledge 
Internalisation 
Explicit 
knowledge to 
tacit knowledge 
The newly developed explicit knowledge is converted 
back to tacit knowledge with the individual. This 
referred to as ‘learning by doing’ (p69). This process is 
facilitated by the documenting of explicit knowledge in 
the form of manuals, procedures or diagrams. 
Documents help individuals internalise knowledge and 
also the transfer of knowledge (p69). 
Operational knowledge 
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The exchange and development of knowledge that describes the knowledge creation 
process is initiated and dependant on individual employees. There is an assumption that 
employees will be committed to knowledge creation and therefore learning. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995 p72) suggest that the organisation has to mobilise and enlarge the tacit 
knowledge, through; ‘expanding communities of interaction that cross sectional, 
departmental, divisional and organizational boundaries’. The use of information technology 
can support and facilitate this process. There is a risk however, that in larger organisations, 
the enlarging process may lead to ‘distortion’ or ‘dilution’ of the original concept.  
Leadership within an organisation also needs to support the sharing of knowledge and 
manage the knowledge creation process (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), with organisation 
structure and culture seen as key components for knowledge management success (Santoro 
and Gopalakrishnan 2000).  
 
The model provides a clear narrative on how knowledge can be developed but is highly 
dependant on organisational structures and culture – particularly the motivation of 
individuals. In 2000, the Department of Health published An Organisation with a Memory, 
which was a report on learning from adverse events in the NHS. The report identified 
three key areas where the NHS falls short of being a learning organisation; there is too 
often a ‘blame’ culture, no account is taken of near misses and there is little culture of self-
appraisal. Li and Gao (2003) also question the transferability of the model since most of 
the most of the case studies are based on assembly line production in Japanese 
manufacturing companies. Clearly these areas of concern present a challenge to the 
application of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s concept within the healthcare organisation, with 
further work needed to identify ways of resolving these issues. 
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2.11 Learning Organisations 
Senge (1990) proposes five disciplines that organisations need to practice to facilitate 
organisational learning, and become learning organisations. These are; mental models, 
personal mastery, shared vision, systems thinking and team learning. Huber (1991) 
identified four constructs related to organisational learning: knowledge acquisition, 
information distribution, information interpretation and organisational memory. He 
proposed that organisational learning is influenced by the processes through which 
knowledge is acquired, shared, commonly understood, and stored for future use. In 
addition Wenger and Snyder (2000) and Brown and Dugdid (1991) emphasise the 
importance of informal communities of practice and the unified view of work and learning. 
Many of these constructs however, are still very conceptual and do not provide a great deal 
of practical guidance on the actual ‘doing’ process of transforming an organisation to a 
learning one. Senge’s five disciplines are based on the assumption that individuals want to 
develop and contribute to these collectively. Senge’s ‘whole systems’ approach, which is 
based on seeing wholes and not parts also seems to contradict the notion of organisational 
learning being based on individual learning. Garvin (1993) is perhaps more insightful, 
stating that learning organisations are not built overnight. Most successful examples are the 
products of carefully cultivated attitudes, commitments and management processes that 
have accrued slowly and steadily over time. He states that the first step is to foster an 
environment that is conducive to learning.    
 
Iles and Sutherland (2001) completed a review of literature on learning organisations and 
identified five key characteristics that were ‘more concrete’ in terms of how organisations 
should be designed and managed to promote effective learning. These are shown in table 3. 
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Table 3: The main characteristics of the Learning Organisation (Iles and Sutherland 2001) 
Structure 
Learning Organisations have flat managerial hierarchies that enhance opportunities for 
employee involvement in the organisation. Members are empowered to make relevant 
decisions. Such structures support teamwork, strong lateral relations, and networking across 
organisational boundaries both internal and external (e.g. project teams). These features 
promote systems thinking, information sharing and openness to information necessary for 
organisational learning. Temporary forms are favoured as they cater for current needs but can 
be shaped through experimentation to respond to future changes. 
Information 
Systems 
Learning Organisations require information beyond that used in traditional organisations 
where information is generally used for control purposes (single-loop learning). 
Transformational change requires more sophisticated information systems that facilitate rapid 
acquisition, processing and sharing of rich, complex information that enables effective 
knowledge management. 
Human Resource 
practices 
People are recognised as the creators and users of organisational learning. Accordingly, human 
resource management focuses on provision and support of individual learning. Appraisal and 
reward systems are concerned to measure long-term performance and to promote the 
acquisition and sharing of new skills and knowledge. 
Organisational 
culture 
Learning Organisations have strong cultures that promote openness, creativity and 
experimentation among members. They encourage members to acquire process and share 
information, to nurture innovation and provide the freedom to try new things, to risk failure 
and to learn from mistakes. 
Leadership 
Like most interventions aimed at securing significant organisational change, organisational 
learning depends heavily on effective leadership. Leaders model the openness, risk taking and 
reflection necessary for learning and communicate a compelling vision of the Learning 
Organisation, providing empathy, support and personal advocacy needed to lead others 
towards it. 
 
These characteristics are much more tangible and provide clearer ‘next steps’ for 
organisations to follow. The five characteristics still underpin the main concepts of other 
theories but are more explicit. It provides an explanation as to some of the features that 
support systems thinking and refers to rewards systems that may act as an incentive for 
individuals to learn and actively contribute to the organisation. There is also an emphasis 
on effective leadership being a key factor, leading by example. Risk taking is also 
acknowledged as part of learning, which is a key part of the double-loop learning process – 
when trying something different. 
 
 
2.12 Communities of Practice 
One of the key themes that have developed from this literature review is that organisational 
learning is highly dependant on the sharing and development of knowledge through social 
processes. Collective learning and systems thinking have also been identified as critical 
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success factors. However, none of the models have provided a definitive solution as to 
how these are achieved. The term ‘communities of practice’ was developed by Lave and 
Wenger (1991) in relation to their work on situated learning. Wenger (1996) states learning 
is most effective when it is part of a social process and that the transfer of knowledge 
should not be isolated from practice, but combined within the context that it exists (Lave 
and Wenger 1991). This view is based upon the principle of social learning theory, where 
individuals learn from social interaction within an organisation and knowledge is socially 
constructed (Elkjaer 2005). The social interaction provides individuals with the opportunity 
to share their mental models and put meaning to them (Elkjaer 2005).  Social learning 
theory also supports the change of knowledge to becoming the active process of knowing 
(Elkjaer 2005). Communities of practice can be described as “groups of people…with 
shared expertise…who share knowledge in free-flowing, creative ways that foster new 
approaches to problems.” (Wenger and Snyder 2000 p3).  Hildreth and Kimble (2004) also 
identify these as groups where such types of knowledge are nurtured, shared and sustained. 
 
The principle of communities of practice can therefore be viewed as an effective method 
of: 
? Developing the skill of putting knowledge in practice, which Brown and Duguid (1998) 
refers to as a core competency for learning organisations. 
? Achieving the ‘combination’ stage of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) model, to develop 
systematic knowledge.  
? Supporting the interaction of the individual and organisation to share and build 
knowledge, thinking collectively. 
 
Communities of practice, however, present a paradox for learning organisations since they 
are essentially informal, self-organising groups of people. As discussed, learning 
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organisations purposely construct structures and strategies to maximise learning (Dodgson 
1993 p14). However, Wenger and Snyder (2000 p10-11) suggest that communities of 
practice can be ‘cultivated’ by management using three steps: 
 
1. Identifying potential communities of practice that will enhance the organisation’s 
strategic capabilities. 
2. Provide an infrastructure and resources to support the communities. 
3. Use non-traditional methods to evaluate the value of the communities – such as 
collecting anecdotal evidence in a systemic way.   
 
Communities of practice are also recognised as being effective within public sector 
organisations and that they assist with the sharing of tacit knowledge (Cong and Pandya 
2003).  Elkjaer (2005) also suggests that communities of practice can be enhanced by 
considering Dewey’s (1966) concepts of inquiry, reflection and experience to help bind the 
concepts of epistemology (how humans become knowledgeable) and ontology (how 
humans become humans) together.      
 
 
2.13 Development of a Conceptual Framework 
The Department of Health’s (2000 p80) ‘key steps in learning from adverse events’ (see 
figure 3) will be used as the basis for developing a conceptual framework that will support 
the investigation of organisation’s effectiveness at learning from adverse incidents. These 
are recognised as crucial steps for the whole process to work effectively (DH 2000).  
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Figure 3:  Key steps in learning from adverse events (DH 2000) 
 
The use of these key steps will assist in providing some context to the identified concepts 
or models and help represent their relationship and purpose within the framework.  
 
The conceptual framework (see figure 4) will be developed using Iles and Sutherlands 5 
characteristics (2001); combined with communities of practice to demonstrate how the key 
steps in figure 2 can be supported and achieved. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) four stages 
of knowledge development will also be incorporated to help represent the relationship 
between organisational learning and the knowledge creation/management process. The key 
steps ‘standardised reporting’ and ‘database maintenance’ have been combined in the 
conceptual framework to ensure alignment with Iles and Sutherland’s characteristics of an 
information system.  
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Figure 4:  Conceptual Framework for learning from adverse incidents 
 
 
The conceptual framework demonstrates that: 
 
1. Culture is considered as an overarching factor for all aspects of the model. 
 
2. Structure and leadership are integral to the success of every level by; integrating 
different departments, supporting team working and also communication.  
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3. Human resource systems and leadership at local level should support the 
development of an open and fair culture and the vision of a learning organisation 
(socialising tacit knowledge) and to champion communities of practice. 
 
4. The information systems would support the reporting, collection and codification 
of information (externalisation of knowledge). The information systems would also 
support the provision of information to communities of practice.  
 
5. The communities of practice would help the social development of knowledge and 
support the development of systemic knowledge (combination). 
 
6. Human resource systems and leadership would support the outcomes of the 
communities of practice by developing operational knowledge through the 
development of procedures and policy and the subsequent process of 
internalisation (learning to do). The underpinning information systems would also 
support by assisting with the storage and transfer of knowledge. 
 
The pyramid shape helps represent the ‘funnelling’ effect of collecting information and its 
subsequent refinement as it moves through the framework to become, in theory, highly 
developed knowledge.   
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Figure 5 highlights the three principle areas of investigation that the research will focus on 
as per the objectives set.   
 
Organisation’s ability to
recognise, identify and
record adverse incidents
Development of new
knowledge and learning
from information.
Implementation of new
learning and knowledge to
improve organisational
performance.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Three principle areas of investigation. 
 
Chapter three will consider the different approaches to research and identify the most 
suitable methods to investigate the organisation’s effectiveness against the developed 
conceptual framework in figure 4. 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Paradigm & Philosophy  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and understand the philosophical positions and 
issues associated with research and to ensure that the research design is appropriate to the 
topic in question with satisfactory outcomes.   
 
Easterby-Smith et al (2004 p27) suggest three reasons why an understanding of philosophy 
in relation to research is beneficial: 
 
? It can help clarify research designs, providing good answers to the basic 
questions being investigated. 
? It can help the researcher to know what research designs will work and not 
work. 
? It can help identify and create/adapt research designs to more specifically meet 
the constraints of the research area. 
 
There are two contrasting philosophical views in relation to social science research; 
positivism and social constructionism. 
 
 
3.2 Positivism 
Positivism is an epistemological position that supports the use of scientific methods to 
study social reality in an objective manner (Bryman 2001). Positivism assumes that the 
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social world (reality) exists externally, is objective and should therefore be measured 
through objective methods. Bryman (2001) describes this ontological assumption as social 
phenomena and their meanings having an existence that is independent of social actors.  
Smith (1998) provides a useful insight into positivist thinking within social sciences by 
stating “Positivist approaches to the social sciences . . . assume things can be studied as 
hard facts and the relationship between these facts can be established as scientific laws.”  
There is also an assumption that knowledge can only be of any value if based on observed 
facts (Easterby-Smith et al 2004).  
 
However, people can be subject to many influences on behaviour, feelings, perceptions, 
and attitudes that positivists would reject as irrelevant (Crossan 2003). Critics of the 
positivist approach also argue that it generates useful but limited data that only provide a 
superficial view of the phenomenon it investigates (Bond 1993, Moccia 1988, Payle 1995).  
The elements of positivist philosophy have a number of implications for social research. 
These are summarised in table 4.  
 
 
3.3 Social Constructionism 
A different and opposing view that has developed during the past half century (as a result 
of applying positivism to social sciences) is that reality is socially constructed and given 
meaning by individuals.   Social constructionism focuses on how people make sense of the 
world through sharing of their experiences with others (Easterby-Smith et al 2004). This 
view recognises the relationship between individual behaviour, attitudes, external structures 
and socio-cultural issues (Crossan 2003). Proctor (1998) also suggests that among the 
various factors that influence reality construction, culture, gender and cultural beliefs are 
the most significant. The focus of research should therefore relate to what people are 
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thinking and feeling, with attention paid to the ways that they communicate with each 
other, verbally and non-verbally. The principle aim should be to understand and explain 
why people have different experiences rather than search for external causes to explain 
behaviour (Easterby-Smith et al 2004). The implications of this view are summarised in 
table 4.  
 
Table 4 also helps highlight the contrasting views of the two research philosophies 
discussed.  
 
Table 4: Contrasting implications of positivism and social constructionism (Easterby-Smith et al 2004 p30) 
 Positivism Social Constructionism 
The observer Must be independent Is part of what is being observed 
Human interests Should be irrelevant Are main drivers of science 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general understanding of situation 
Research prog essesr  
through Hypotheses and deductions 
Gathering rich data from which ideas 
are induced 
Concepts Need to be operationalised so that they can be measured 
Should incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to simplest terms May include the complexity of ‘whole’ situations 
Generalisation 
through Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires Large numbers selected at random Small numbers of cases chosen for specific reasons 
 
A number of advantages and disadvantages relating to these different approaches to 
research are summarised in table 5. 
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Table 5: Advantages and disadvantages of positivism and social constructionism approaches to research 
(adapted from Saunders et al 2000)  
 Positivism Social Constructionism  
Advantages 
1. Economical collection of large 
amounts of data. 
2. Clear theoretical focus for the 
research from the outset. 
3. Greater opportunity for researcher to 
retain control of the research process. 
4. Easily comparable data. 
1. Facilitates understanding of how and 
why. 
2. Enables researcher to be alive to 
changes, which occur during the 
research process. 
3. Good at understanding social 
processes. 
Disadvantages
1. Inflexible, direction often cannot be 
changed once data collection has 
begun. 
2. Weak at understanding social 
processes. 
3. Often doesn’t discover the meanings 
people attach to social phenomena. 
1. Data collection can be time 
consuming. 
2. Data analysis is difficult. 
3. Researcher has to live with the 
uncertainty that clear patterns may 
not emerge. 
4. Generally perceived as less credible 
by non –researchers. 
 
 
 
3.4 Relativist 
A third philosophical viewpoint is the relativist position. This is based on the assumption 
that different observers may have different viewpoints and that, ‘what counts for the truth 
can vary from place to place and from time to time’ (Collins, 1983 p88).  A variant of the 
relativist position is that of critical realism. This can be considered to be a compromise 
between the two extreme positions discussed earlier.  
 
Easterby-Smith et al (2004) state that critical realism not only recognises the social world 
and its influencing factors but that there are also concepts and structures that are human 
constructions. Bryan (2001 p13) provides a useful description of critical realism as a 
viewpoint; “First, it implies that, whereas positivists take the view that the scientist’s 
conceptualisation of reality actually directly reflects that reality, realists argue that the 
scientist’s conceptualisation is simply a way of knowing that reality”. 
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Critical realism recognises that reality exists separately from human thought processes and 
that some external factors will affect how the world is perceived. It also has similarities to 
positivism in that it recognises the need for similar scientific methods to support robust 
data collection and measurement. However, critical realism is not confined to the physically 
observed and will consider unobserved social phenomena in its explanations (Bryan 2001).   
It is similar to social constructionism, in that it recognises that people cannot be studied as 
in the natural sciences.  
 
Relativism is therefore more concerned with exposing and identifying what reality is as 
opposed to inventing or discovering it. Easterby-Smith et al (2004) state that a number of 
different approaches may be used on this basis, including triangulation of methods and 
surveying large samples of people.  Table 6 represents the three philosophical views 
discussed and corresponding methodological implications. 
 
Table 6: Methodological implications of different epistemologies within social science (Easterby-Smith et al 
2004 p34) 
 
 Social Science Epistemologies 
 Positivism Relativism Social Constructivism 
Elements of Methods    
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points Hypotheses Suppositions Meanings 
Designs Experiment Triangulation Reflexivity 
Techniques Measurement Survey Conversation 
Analysis/interpretation Verification/falsification Probability Sense-making 
Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
 
 
3.5 Philosophical Position 
The principle objective of this research project is to investigate the organisation’s 
effectiveness at knowledge management and learning, from adverse incidents, using the 
conceptual framework developed in chapter 2 (figure 4).  
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The literature review clearly identified organisational learning and knowledge management 
are highly dependant and influenced by the social processes that exist within an 
organisation.  Many elements from the conceptual framework (figure 4) are also closely 
linked to social processes. Culture is seen as an overarching factor for all aspects of the 
model, with leadership integral to each level of the pyramid. Communities of practice are 
central to the framework and support the social development of knowledge.  These would 
appear to justify a social constructionism approach to the research design.  
 
However, there are some tangible elements to the framework that would lend themselves 
more to a positivist approach. Human resource practices are a key element within the 
framework and concerned with having appropriate systems in place to support learning. 
These may take the form of policies, procedures and appraisal or reward systems. 
Information systems are also a key element to the success of the framework. These may be 
made up of ‘physical’ Information Technology systems or exist as formalised procedures. 
However, the influence they may have on individuals and their behaviour may suggest that 
a relativism approach is more appropriate than positivism.  
 
Structure is another integral element at each stage of the framework. There are clear, 
tangible elements that exist in relation to structure but the effect that they have, good or 
bad, on the social elements of learning and people’s behaviours also need to be considered. 
A relativist approach is again, the most appropriate method.   
 
Overall the combination of tangible ‘real’ elements and social processes, within the 
conceptual framework, indicate that a relativist approach is the most suitable when 
considering the research design.   
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3.6 Research Strategy 
There are many research strategies that exist including; experimental, cross-sectional, 
longitudinal, and fieldwork. A case study design has been identified as most appropriate 
since the research intends to focus on a specific area of the organisation, for a specific topic 
or ‘case’.  Bryman (2001) states that case studies relate to a community, location or 
organisation with an emphasis on the detailed examination of the setting. The case study 
design is also viewed as a more intermediate position between the two extremes of 
experimental (positivist) and fieldwork (social constructionism) (Easterby-Smith et al 2004), 
which supports the relativist approach identified previously. Case studies are also 
considered to be closer to action research, with greater concern to deliver change within 
the research setting (Stake 1995). Another important consideration of the case study design 
is that of external validity and generalisability. It is recognised that the research will only 
have internal validity to the organisation and cannot be used to generalise about other 
ambulance services.  
 
The case study design is often (and wrongly) associated with qualitative research; however 
both qualitative and quantitative methods are frequently used (Bryman 2001), which again 
reflects the intermediate view of Easterby-Smith et al (2004).  
 
Quantitative research is normally related to a positivist approach and is emphasised by 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data. Quantitative includes: 
 
? a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in 
which the accent is placed on the testing of theories;  
? the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in 
particular; and 
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? embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality (Bryman 
2001 p20). 
 
This type of research tends to be measurable and numerical in nature with high reliability, 
low validity. 
 
Qualitative research is normally more concerned with words and meaning and a research 
strategy that;  
 
? emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research, in which the emphasis is on the generation of theories; 
? has rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model in 
preference for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their 
social world; and 
? embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of 
individuals’ creation (Bryman 2001 p20). 
 
This type of research tends to be subjective using non-standardised data, with the 
development of classifications and concepts. The results tend to have high validity but low 
reliability. 
 
Despite the distinction between the two strategies, and the distinction between the two 
paradigms, there are increasing arguments to combine the two strategies (Easterby-Smith et 
al (2004; Bryman 2001), because it provides a wider perspective on the subject under 
investigation. The combination of the two strategies will also ensure high reliability and 
validity. The relativist position and case study design, in terms of research strategy, are also 
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distinct in that they allow the use of multiple sources of data and perspectives to be 
considered. However large sample sizes are required for this approach and there is risk of 
not being able to reconcile data discrepancies.  
 
 
3.7 Research Methodology 
Having already established a relativist approach for the research project and that a case 
study design is appropriate; it is necessary to use a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods for the research methodology to achieve methodological triangulation.  
Todd (1979) suggests this is an effective way of maximising data collected. The aim of 
developing this methodology is to ensure that the results are both reliable and valid and 
that the weaknesses of any one single method will be offset by another. Husey and Husey 
(1997) state that triangulation will also assist elimination of personal bias and reduce the 
risk of an unproductive study. 
 
Three different techniques for gathering data have been identified for this study: secondary 
analysis, self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. 
 
The research objectives 1, 2 and 3 from chapter 1 will be used to form the basis of the 
research methodology. Figure 6 demonstrates the relationship between the objectives and 
the elements of the conceptual framework to be investigated. The culture, leadership and 
structure elements are considered integral to all stages of the framework and will therefore 
be investigated as part of each objective. 
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The research and data collection is limited to the Greater Manchester Area of the Trust 
(the author’s geographical area of work). This is due to the time constraints of the study, 
ease of managing the project and ability to access evidence and staff as part of the research.   
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knowledge and learning from
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Figure 6: Relationship between research objectives and the conceptual framework 
 
 
 
3.8 Secondary Analysis 
Secondary analysis is the analysis of data that has been collected by another researcher – 
normally as part of another research project. Data from other organisations, such as 
national statistics may also be used as secondary data. There are some advantages to this 
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method including; improved cost and time efficiency, potential for high quality data and 
more time to focus on the analysis. However, there are some disadvantages such as; lack of 
familiarity with the data, lack of control over data quality (it may be too old) and it may not 
be sufficiently context specific.  
 
The NHS Staff Survey 2006, which was conducted in October 2006, was used as a 
quantitative method for data collection. The results are published on a Trust by Trust basis. 
Only the survey results for The Northwest Ambulance Service Trust were used. The survey 
is not specifically designed to investigate organisational learning but aspects of it do relate 
closely to the elements of the conceptual framework under investigation. The Picker 
Institute are responsible for managing the survey and production of the results. The use of 
Self-completion questionnaires to collect data also has some disadvantages including; 
closed questioning, limited depth of questioning, unable to prompt or guide the respondent 
and uniformity of answers. A more in depth consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantages is provided in table 8. 
 
Specific areas of the survey that are useful for secondary anlaysis include: 
? Management including; appraisal, training and development 
? Errors, near misses and incidents 
? ‘Your job’ including team working, leadership and the organisation 
? Work/life balance, pay and other motivational factors  
 
 
Secondary Analysis Sample Size 
A total of 4298 staff within the Trust were identified as eligible to receive the survey. 
Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 842 staff. 398 completed questionnaires 
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were returned; representing a return rate of 47%, which is average for ambulance trusts in 
England (HCC 2006). 
 
The 398 returns represent 9.26% of the Trust workforce and with a confidence level of 
95%, provide a confidence interval of 3.57%. 
 
A total of 129 completed questionnaires were received from the Greater Manchester Area, 
which represents nearly one third (32.4%) of the total returns for the Trust.  
 
 
3.9 Self-completion Questionnaire 
A self-completion questionnaire was designed to quantitatively investigate the elements of 
the conceptual framework (Appendix 1). The questionnaire was also used to investigate 
further any areas of interest or enquiry from the secondary analysis. The questionnaire 
consisted of closed, scale questions. A Likert scale rating was used for the majority of 
questions, ranging from one to four, thus avoiding a middle non-committal answer. Some 
questions also provided an opportunity for additional comments to be added. The 
questionnaires were designed to be anonymous.  
 
Self-completion questions have several advantages including; cost and time efficient, 
absence of interviewer effects, convenience for respondents and also lack of interviewer 
variability in terms of asking questions in different ways. There are also a number of 
disadvantages that include; closed questioning may limit data collected or depth of 
questioning, unable to prompt or guide the respondent, difficult to ask a lot of questions 
and potentially low response rates. A more in depth consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantages is provided in table 7. 
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The questionnaire was initially piloted with ten employees. This led to a number of 
modifications including; an additional comments box at the end of the questionnaire to 
collect more general comments or information, an indicator of how long the questionnaire 
would take to complete and also the option to include name and contact details for 
participation in the semi-structured interviews. 
 
Self-completion Questionnaire Sample Size 
The sampling for distribution of the self-completion questionnaires was completely 
random. A sample size calculator from http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html was used 
to identify a sample size that would ensure the results achieve a confidence level of 95% 
with a confidence interval of 5%. 302 was identified as a suitable sample size from a 
population of approximately 1400 employees in the Greater Manchester area. 
 
A total of 700 self-completion questionnaires were distributed equally among the 35 
ambulance stations and offices in the Greater Manchester Area (20 per station). A single 
collection folder was also supplied to each station. Arrangements were then made for 
folders to be collected after a period of two weeks. Promotional posters, with clear 
instructions and timescales, were placed on every station to increase staff awareness. The 
self-completion questionnaire was also emailed to every member of staff in the area. A 
reminder email and memo was distributed after the first week. 
 
Return Rate 
The return rate for the Self-completion Questionnaire was 173 (24.7%). This was 
significantly lower than expected. Assuming a confidence level of 95%, the confidence 
interval for the results was 6.98%.   
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3.10 Semi-structured Interviews      
Semi-structured interviews were used as a qualitative method of cross-checking and 
validating the data collected from the secondary analysis and self-completion 
questionnaires, including gaining a more in depth understanding of the area under 
investigation.  Interviewees were selected from across different departments within the 
area. A series of questions were used to cover specific points that were either; identified 
developing themes or concepts from the earlier data analysis or elements of the conceptual 
framework that had not been adequately investigated (Appendix 2). A framework was 
developed to record answers for each of the questions under the headings of; awareness of 
the topic/issue, positive and negative aspects. The interviews also provided an opportunity 
to ask more open questions and to allow greater flexibility in the direction of questioning 
and the responses from the interviewees.  It was acknowledged that some of the 
interviewees may have felt reluctant to be completely open and honest when answering the 
questions due to the author’s managerial position within the Trust. Every effort was made 
to ensure that the interviews were as informal as possible and that the interviewees 
understood the process was confidential and that the collected data would be anonymised. 
The interviews were set for one hour per interviewee, with most of them being completed 
within this time. The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and notes were also 
taken. The interviewees were informed of how the data would be collected and all 
consented to this. Table 7 provides a more in depth consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantages of this method. 
 
Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of allowing much greater interest in the 
interviewee’s views; identifying what is important and relevant to them. It also provides 
scope for the interview to depart from the set line of questioning, which may identify 
previously unconsidered areas and also provide much richer, in depth answers. Conversely, 
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the interviewee may feel reluctant to be honest due to the lack of anonymity associated 
with a face to face interview. The interviewer also requires a degree of skill to ensure that 
the interview does not depart to far from the subject under investigation.  
 
Semi-structured Interviews Sample Size 
Due to the time constraints of the study it was necessary to select a small sample of eight 
staff for participation in the semi-structured interviews. The following staff groups were 
interviewed from the Greater Manchester Area: 
 
? 1 x Area Director – responsible for overall management of the Area. 
? 1 x Sector Manager – responsible for managing the operational aspects of a specific 
sector area (there are three sectors). 
? 1 x Risk & Safety Manager – has responsibility for managing incident reporting 
procedures and ensuring appropriate action is taken. 
? 3 x Operational clinical staff – responsible for delivering pre-hospital care to 
patients, including reporting incidents when they occur. These staff were selected 
from details provided on returned questionnaires. One clinical staff member was 
selected from each sector. 
? 1x Clinical Practice Trainer – a Paramedic who also provides operationally based 
education and training to staff. 
? 1 x Human Resource Manager – responsible for the provision of human resource 
advice and support.    
 
Table 7 on the next page provides a comparison of the three methods used and 
demonstrates that methodological triangulation was achieved. 
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Table 7: Review of research methods to demonstrate methodological triangulation 
 COMPARISON OF ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES OF RESEARCH METHODS 
Secondary 
Analysis of 
NHS staff 
survey 
Reduced 
cost and 
time to 
complete 
+ 
Unknown 
quality of 
data. 
Data may 
be too 
old. 
_ 
Anonymity 
– improved 
honesty of 
answers 
+ 
More time 
for data 
analysis 
+ 
Reanalysis 
may offer new 
interpretations 
+ 
Lack of 
familiarity 
with data 
_ 
Complexity 
of data 
_ 
No control 
over data 
quality 
_ 
Not 
specific 
enough to 
area of 
research 
_ 
Lack of 
opportunity for 
more 
comprehensive 
replies/difficult 
to make forced 
choice answers 
mutually 
exclusive 
- 
No face to 
face 
contact/lack 
of visual 
clues 
_ 
Variation in the 
interpretation 
of forced-
choice answers. 
Answers may 
be uniformed. 
_ 
Self-
completion 
Questionnaire 
(closed 
questions) 
 
Some cost. 
Low 
amount of  
time to 
complete 
+ 
High 
Quality 
recent 
data 
+ 
Anonymity 
– improved 
honesty of 
answers 
+ 
Efficient 
method 
for 
collecting 
data 
+ 
Enhanced 
comparability 
of 
answers/easy 
to analyse 
+ 
Familiar 
with data 
+ 
Reduced 
variability 
in the 
recording 
of answers 
+ 
Control 
over data 
quality – 
closed 
questions 
can clarify 
meaning for 
respondents 
+ 
Questions 
designed 
to ensure 
context 
specific 
+ 
Lack of 
opportunity for 
more 
comprehensive 
replies/difficult 
to make forced 
choice answers 
mutually 
exclusive 
- 
No face to 
face 
contact/lack 
of visual 
clues 
_ 
Variation in the 
interpretation 
of forced-
choice answers. 
Answers may 
be uniformed. 
_ 
Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
(open 
questions) 
Some cost. 
Large 
amount of 
time to 
complete 
_ 
High 
quality 
recent 
data 
+ 
Face to face 
– lack of 
anonymity 
– possible 
lack of 
honesty 
when 
answering 
_ 
Time 
consuming 
process 
for 
collection 
of data 
_ 
Difficult to 
compare 
answers due 
to varying 
structure to 
interviews/ 
difficult to 
analyse 
_ 
Familiar 
with data 
+ 
Increased 
variability 
in the 
recording 
of answers 
+ 
Reduced 
control 
over data 
quality – 
open 
questions 
and less 
structure 
_ 
Questions 
designed 
to ensure 
context 
specific 
+ 
Good 
opportunity to 
gain more 
comprehensive 
replies/ 
improved 
flexibility to 
answer 
questions freely 
+ 
Face to face 
contact/abilit
y to gauge 
reactions to 
questions 
+ 
Ability to 
clarify 
nature/content 
of questions 
with 
interviewee 
+ 
Triangulation 
achieved 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Cross Mapping Matrix 
The Cross Mapping Matrix (table 8) is designed to ensure that triangulation of the methods 
will occur for each of the objectives and that the conceptual framework is fully utilised in 
the investigation.  The conceptual framework has been split into six principle elements, 
with the objectives designed to investigate their role at different stages in the framework (as 
previously described in figure 6). 
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 Table 8: Cross Mapping Matrix  
 Research Objectives 
Element of Conceptual 
Framework 
To investigate the organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and record adverse 
incidents. 
 
To investigate development of new 
knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation 
To investigate the organisation’s 
implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve organisational 
performance. 
 
SD 
Questions 
SCQ      SSI
SD 
Questions 
SCQ SSI
SD 
Questions 
SCQ SSI
Culture 34A, B, C, 
 
2A,B,C,D, I 
 
 
C1.1 
 
34D 
 
2E, F, G 
 
 
C2.1, C2.2 
 
34E 
 
2H 
7A 
 
C3.1 
 
Leadership 
16A 
18B 
20B, E 
4A, B, F 
 
 
L1.1 
 
 
16C 
19B,  
22A 
 
 
4C,D, E, H 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.1, L2.2, 
L2.3 
 
 
 
16B 
19D 
20C 
 
 
 
4G 
7B 
 
 
 
 
L3.1, L3.2 
 
 
 
Structure 
 
22D 
 
 
3A, B, C 
 
 
S1.1, S1.2 
 
 
15A, C, D 
 
 
3C, D, E, F, 
G 
 
S2.1 
 
22B 
 
3C, H, I 
 
 
S3.1 
 
Human Resource Practices 24B 
 
 
1A, B, D 
 
 
 
HR1.1 
 
N/A   N/A
 
N/A 
 
7A, B  
8A, B, C 
13B 
1E, F, G, H 
7C 
 
 
HR3.1 
 
Information Systems 
10E 
32C 
1C 
5A, B, C 
 
IS1.1 
 
34F 5D, E, G IS2.1, IS2.2 34G 
5F 
7D, E 
 
IS3.1 
Communities of Practice N/A      N/A
 
N/A 
 
 
15D 
 
 
6A, B, C, D, 
E, F 
 
CP2.1, 
CP2.2, 
CP2.3, 
CP2.4, 
CP2.5 
N/A N/A
 
N/A 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the findings from the selected research methods discussed in chapter 
3. The findings will be structured and presented by the elements of the conceptual 
framework (figure 4) and then by research method, using the following headings: 
 
? Element of Conceptual Framework 
? Secondary Data Results 
? Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
? Semi-structured Interview Results 
? Commentary in relation to the objectives and secondary literature 
 
Demographic Profile of staff completing NHS Staff Survey (Secondary Data) 
Of the 393 respondents, 61% were male and 39% female. The number of years that the 
respondents had worked for the organisation was as follows: 
 
Number of Years Worked for the Organisation
(n = 398)
Less than a year
8%
3-5 years
22%
6-10 years
15%
11-15 years
14%
Over 15 years
25%
Did not specify
1% 1-2 years
15%
 
Figure 7 
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Analysis of the respondents by occupational groups was as follows: 
Occupational Group  
 
 
Other qualified Allied Health Professionals 1% 
Paramedic 26% 
Ambulance Technician 21% 
Ambulance Control Staff 10% 
Patient Transport Service 24% 
Administrative & Clerical 6% 
Central Functions/Corporate Services (e.g. HR, 
Finance, Information Systems, Information 
Technology) 4% 
Maintenance/Ancillary 2% 
General Management 2% 
Other 3% 
Did not specify 1% 
   Figure 8 
 
Demographic Profile of staff completing Self-completion Questionnaires 
Of the 173 respondents, 58% were male and 42% female. The number of years that the 
respondents had worked for the organisation was as follows: 
 
Number of Years Worked for the Organisation
(n = 173)
0-5 years
24%
6-10 years
52%
11-20 years
9%
21+ years
15%
 
Figure 9 
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Analysis of the respondents by occupational groups was as follows: 
Occupational Group  
 
 
Administrative & Clerical 3% 
Ambulance Technician 28% 
Clinical Practice Supervisor/Trainer 9% 
Emergency Care Practitioner 2% 
Paramedic 43% 
Paramedic Emergency Service Manager 2% 
Patient Transport Service Manager 2% 
Senior Manager 3% 
Support Service Manager 5% 
Support Service Staff 3% 
Training Manager 2% 
   Figure 10 
 
Demographic Profile of staff participating in semi structured interviews 
Of the 8 interviewees, 75% were male and 25% female. The number of years that the 
interviewees had worked for the organisation was as follows: 
 
Number of Years Worked for the Organisation
(n = 8)
0-5 years
25%
6-10 years
49%
11-20 years
13%
21+ years
13%
 
Figure 11 
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Analysis of the interviewees by occupational groups was as follows: 
Occupational Group  
 
 
Ambulance Technician 13% 
Clinical Practice Supervisor/Trainer 13% 
Paramedic 25% 
Paramedic Emergency Service Manager 13% 
Senior Manager 13% 
Support Service Manager 25% 
   Figure 12 
 
 
4.1 Culture 
4.1.1 Objective 1: The organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record adverse 
incidents. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
n = 391
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor
Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Q34 a. My trust treats fairly staff who are involved in an error, near miss or incident.
Q34 b. My trust encourages us to report errors, near misses or incidents.
Q34 c. My trust treats reports of errors, near misses or incidents confidentially.
 
Figure 13 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Disagree Strongly
2a. I would feel confident reporting an adverse incident that involved myself or another member of staff to my line manager.
2b. The Trust supports an open and fair culture, including the reporting of adverse incidents, through policies, procedures and standards.
2c. The Trust has an open and fair culture.
2i. The Trust has a culture of blame and punishment.                                                        
 
Figure 14 
 
 Agree Strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
2d. I am encouraged to 
report all adverse incidents. 
(n = 173)                              
19% 42% 36% 3% 
Figure 15 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QC1.1  
How would you describe the culture in relation to staff recognising the importance 
of reporting adverse incidents within Greater Manchester? 
 
All staff acknowledged the importance of reporting incidents and felt that there was a good 
level of awareness among the majority of staff with regard to incident reporting and its 
importance. All interviewees expressed the view that staff had a tendency to only report 
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incidents that directly affected themselves and would not necessarily report near misses or 
observed incidents involving others. When questioned about this further, two key themes 
emerged;  
 
1. staff reported incidents ‘to cover themselves’ in case of a future complaint or claim 
and; 
2. because they viewed work from a very individual point of view and didn’t consider 
the ‘bigger picture’.  
 
The managers felt there was also an abuse of the reporting system by some staff, including 
over reporting by certain individuals. Examples included; disturbed meal breaks and 
grievances about working late.  
 
The operational staff also expressed concern about reporting incidents or near misses that 
affected patients in case it led to further action against them: 
 
“Staff can get away with near misses since nothing actually happened… people just deal with it at 
the time.” 
 
The interviewees, that were not part of the operational structure, felt that incident 
reporting was only undertaken within the operational environment and that staff in other 
directorates would not necessarily utilise it.  
 
The culture within management was also discussed. It was felt that at a senior level there 
was commitment to an open and fair culture and that the “right things were said”. 
Management, within the operational environment, was viewed as being very supportive in 
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relation to personal issues but less supportive or effective in relation to more complex 
organisational issues or issues involving other organisations.  
 
Two reasons were suggested for this: 
 
1. Operational pressures to maintain levels of resource i.e. focussing on individual 
cases to reduce the risk of a member of staff going sick.  
 
2. Managers lack of knowledge to deal with more clinically related or complex 
incidents. It was emphasised that this was not necessarily a criticism of the 
individuals but the organisation for not providing sufficient education or support. 
 
It was also felt that some Operational Managers lacked ownership of the incident reporting 
process.  
 
Commentary 
The results indicate that the Trust encourages staff to report incidents and that staff are 
generally confident to report incidents. The Secondary Data (SD) and Self-completion 
Questionnaire (SCQ) both showed that the majority of respondents (66% and 61% 
respectively) agreed the Trust encouraged them to report adverse incidents. However, it 
was apparent that staff and management had a tendency to think of incident reporting at a 
very individual level. There was failure to recognise the ability of incident reporting for 
identifying wider organisational issues such as meal breaks; that could assist in improving 
overall organisational performance. This is reflected within the wider NHS, with a 
recognised need to ‘think systems’ and that a person-centred approach is still the ‘dominant 
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tradition’ (DH 2000 p20). Senge (1990) highlights ‘systems thinking’ as one of the five 
disciplines required for a learning organisation.   
  
56% of the respondents to the SCQ agreed that the Trust was supportive of an open and 
fair culture through policies and procedures, yet only 43% agreed that the culture was open 
and fair, with 56% agreeing there was a culture of blame and punishment. The SD also 
indicated that only 37% of respondents agreed that the Trust treated staff fairly following 
an adverse incident, with 47% non-committal in their response. This was apparent in the 
interviews where staff also suggested that they only reported what they had to.  Senior 
management is supportive of an open culture; however lower levels of management tend 
only to be supportive of issues that have an immediate positive impact on operational 
resources. Undue focus on the immediate event, a tendency to manage or blame individuals 
and difficulties in ‘making sense’ of complex issues are also acknowledged as barriers to 
organisational learning within the wider NHS (DH 2000).  
 
The NPSA (2004 p23) suggest that:  
 
“Leadership is central to setting the values and beliefs of an organisation’s culture…..a vital role 
to play in building a safety culture that is open and fair. They need to establish an environment 
where the whole organisation learns from safety incidents and where staff are actively encouraged to 
report” 
 
This is closely linked to what are considered the key elements of the initial ‘socialisation’ 
mode of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
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4.1.2 Objective 2: The development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
 
Q34d. My trust blames or punishes people who make errors, 
near misses or incidents.
(n= 390)
Strongly Agree
5% Agree
18%
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
51%
Disagree
22%
Strongly 
Disagree
4%
 
Figure 16 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n= 173
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Disagree Strongly
2e. Learning is encouraged from adverse incidents at an individual level.
2f. The Trust encourages staff to be innovative and suggests new ideas or ways of working.
2g. The Trust has a culture that supports staff to work and learn together to develop new knowledge.
 
Figure 17 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QC2.1 
How would you describe the culture in relation to learning and developing 
knowledge from adverse incidents? 
 
All interviewees agreed that there was a culture of learning but to differing degrees and in 
different contexts. 
 
The operational staff all suggested that individuals probably learned from adverse incidents. 
When the interviewees were questioned further about what they meant by learning it was 
more a case of “they wouldn’t do it again”. The lack of support and information sharing from 
management and protected time to encourage learning was also mentioned: 
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“Managers must be aware of what goes on since they see virtually every incident report. They don’t 
share it with staff and most of the time they just tell the staff involved to read a policy or not to do 
it again.”   
 
“The managers are more interested in 8 minute performance and it is difficult to get time off the 
road for anything other than mandatory training days, which we don’t have a say in.” 
  
Some interviewees suggested that staff would be more concerned about learning from 
more severe incidents. Conversely, the less severe incidents were reported simply as part of 
the incident reporting process with no concern about learning or change as a result. 
 
The managers felt there was a learning culture within management, with an increasing 
focus on systematic learning the more senior the management became.  When asked why 
staff might not agree with this view it was suggested that: 
 
“Most of the work goes on behind the scenes, such as in Healthcare Governance, and staff only see 
a finished product with little understanding of the work involved or why the reason for the change.” 
 
“Staff only tend to hear about when somebody is disciplined. There is not enough publicity about 
staff that have learned through the Untoward Incident Review process and how positive they found 
it. We don’t share the learning from these reviews either, which doesn’t help. ” 
 
It was also suggested that the learning culture within lower levels of management was 
inconsistent from area to area, with some managers more focused on simply preventing re-
occurrence by taking action against the staff involved. It was also suggested that some 
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operational managers felt that the “learning bit” was undertaken by the other departments 
and that “it wasn’t their job”.    
 
The Clinical Effectiveness Forum was mentioned by some of the interviewees as a useful 
opportunity for staff to discuss clinical issues openly, with a focus on learning collectively.  
The Trust Untoward Incident Review Policy was cited by the majority of interviewees as an 
effective method of encouraging staff to reflect and learn from adverse incidents.  
 
QC2.2 
Does the culture support the sharing of knowledge? 
Two clear themes emerged from the interviewees regarding this question; formal and 
informal sharing of knowledge. 
 
From a formal perspective it was felt that the culture, at an operational level, wasn’t 
supportive of sharing knowledge. There was also the view that knowledge was often shared 
“up the way” from staff to management but that it was never used or there was never any 
feedback. The Untoward Incident Review and disciplinary processes were also mentioned 
as being too confidential; supporting an individual learning culture and not encouraging the 
learning to be shared.   
 
Staff Forums were mentioned by many of the interviewees as a positive step to 
encouraging staff to share knowledge.   
 
Poor sharing of knowledge between operational managers was highlighted as a concern. It 
was felt that there was an element of competitiveness between operational groups where 
“knowledge or information is still viewed as power”. When questioned further about this, it became 
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apparent that this was probably a result of the performance culture in relation to 
ambulance response times; where each operational group was benchmarked against each 
other.  
 
From an informal perspective the majority of interviewees felt that there was a strong 
culture of knowledge sharing, particularly by operational staff. The predominant examples 
cited were “mess room chat” and “crews waiting outside Accident and Emergency departments”, where 
staff frequently discuss recent events.  
 
“Crews will come into the mess room and quite happily start talking about what just happened to 
them or tell their peers what or who to watch out for, but they won’t tell the managers.” 
 
“Staff will often hang about outside of Accident and Emergency while having a drink and talk to 
each other about problems they have encountered with patients or work that day – particularly if 
they have missed their meal break!”  
 
Interestingly, many of the managers expressed concern about the accuracy of the 
information that was shared via these methods, with one using the term “rumours” to 
describe the information shared.   
 
Commentary  
An individualistic learning culture is apparent; however, it appears to be one that primarily 
focuses on being reactive to significant single events. There is also some evidence of a 
blame culture existing, with inconsistencies in management behaviour between operational 
groups.  The SD indicated only 26% of respondents disagreed that the Trust blamed or 
punished staff who make errors, with 51% non-committal in their response.  The majority 
59 
of respondents to the SCQ felt the Trust did not encourage staff to suggest new ideas or 
ways of working (57%) or have a culture of staff working and learning together (61%). Iles 
and Sutherland (2001) suggest that a strong culture is required to encourage staff to share 
information and work together with an openness to try new things and learn from 
mistakes.  
 
The lack of action or concern with regard to less significant incidents is also evident. There 
also appears to be a reluctance to identify the root causes of incidents, which may help lead 
to more systemic learning. An understanding of the link between learning from these types 
of events and improving organisational performance was not apparent. Dodgson (1993) 
recognises culture as a key element in supporting collective learning and establishing the 
link with improving organisational performance.  
 
There are some examples of where a more collective learning culture is encouraged but this 
is not widespread. The performance focussed culture in relation to response times and a 
lack of capacity within management appear to be the key limiting factors.   
 
There is evidence of a more systematic approach to learning within more senior 
management and support management functions. However, this is not well publicised or 
perhaps as inclusive of staff. This has led to lower levels of management having the view 
that learning and knowledge development is not part of their responsibilities.  
 
Culture supporting the sharing of knowledge within the organisation appears to be 
effective mostly at an informal level between staff. The Trust policies and processes in 
relation to adverse incidents also focus on learning at a very individual level; with a strong 
emphasis on confidentiality. This has limited the transfer of developed knowledge into the 
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organisation as a whole.  This is similar to the challenges facing the knowledge conversion 
process of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) Four Modes of Knowledge Conversion; 
particularly how the organisation can develop systemic knowledge. 
 
 
4.1.3 Objective 3: The organisation’s implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve performance. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor
Disagree
Disagree Strongly Disagree
Q34e. When errors, near misses or incidents are reported, my trust takes action to
ensure that they do not happen again. (n = 392)
 
Figure 18 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Disagree Strongly
2h. The Trust is committed to taking action to improve organisational performance as a result of adverse
incidents.
7a. I am aware of changes made by the Trust as a result of adverse incidents.
 
Figure 19 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QC3.1 
Can you describe the Trust’s culture with regard to taking action or making 
improvement following adverse incidents? 
The majority of interviewees felt there was a positive culture in relation to taking action 
following adverse incidents; however, this was mainly associated with more severe types of 
incidents.  
 
The operational staff expressed the view that there was less of a focus on taking action as a 
result of clinical incidents by local managers and that action taken was often only against 
the individuals involved. Some of the managers agreed with these points and felt that many 
of the local managers didn’t necessarily have the knowledge to tackle what were viewed as 
more complex problems. Some suggested this was more a failing of the Trust, through lack 
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of investment in education and development for lower levels of management.  The current 
merger and lack of clarity around the re-structuring processes were also cited as a de-
motivating factor for many managers. 
 
The performance culture was seen, by the majority of interviewees, to have an influence on 
whether operational managers would be supportive of any actions or changes proposed. It 
was also suggested that operational managers do not believe part of their role is to 
implement learning outcomes and that was the role of other directorates.   
 
“In the short time I have been with the service, the quality of some manager’s investigation and 
action has improved……. We need to identify practical ways of getting the message across to 
managers (and staff), and of cascading well written policies and guidance into practical application 
at the operational end of the organisation – with inbuilt feedback systems to identify what is 
working and what is not.” 
 
It was highlighted by most interviewees that staff are often resistant to changes in clinical 
practice. When asked why this was two themes emerged: 
 
? That staff are often unaware of why the change has come about.  
 
? The recently introduced national pay scheme, Agenda for Change, has left some 
groups of staff unhappy with their pay scale and some groups of staff at the top a 
pay scale; feeling there is no incentive to change or develop their practice.    
 
The managers felt that senior management were very supportive of change and effective at 
identifying and agreeing what action was required. However, concern was raised about the 
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quality and of implementation at an operational level. The lack of review following actions 
or changes, to assess their effectiveness, was also highlighted as a concern. 
 
Commentary  
41% of respondents in the SD agreed or strongly agreed that the Trust takes action to 
prevent re-occurrence, with only 14% disagreeing. The SCQ identified that 50% of 
respondents agreed the Trust took action to improve organisational performance and 53% 
were aware of changes as a result of an adverse incident.  
 
The semi-structured interviews identified however, that the culture of action is 
predominantly centred on individuals and non-clinical incidents. It is also apparent that this 
culture of action is not always a result of true learning, as identified in 4.1.2, but simply a 
reaction to prevent re-occurrence.  
 
A culture of action resulting from clinical incidents was less apparent at an operational level 
but more apparent within other directorates or senior management.  Lack of ownership 
within operational management may also be why senior management expressed concerns 
over the quality of implementation. This is a key challenge to the final part of Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s (1999) knowledge conversion process whereby explicit knowledge is converted 
back to tacit knowledge to create operational knowledge.  
 
Staff supporting action or change as a result of clinical incidents seems to be adversely 
affected by poor communication of the history behind a change and poor morale as a 
result of the Agenda for Change pay awards. One of the key concepts of learning 
organisations is their ability to adapt and respond to change (Peters and Waterman, 1982; 
Kanter, 1989; Senge, 1990), with an ability to manage for uncertainty – particularly within 
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the NHS (Ranade 1997).  Iles and Sutherland (2001) state that learning organisations 
should have a strong culture where staff are encouraged to experiment and try new things.  
 
 
4.2 Leadership 
4.2.1 Objective 1: The organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record 
adverse incidents. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
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Figure 20 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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4f. Managers act with empathy and support 
when managing adverse incidents. (n = 173)   
0% 51% 37% 11% 
Figure 23 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QL1.1 
Can you discuss how managers are perceived within the Trust; in relation to them 
acting as leaders to support an open and fair culture? 
The majority of staff suggested that their managers were supportive of an open and fair 
culture. However, all interviewees indicated that not all managers acted in an open and fair 
way.  
 
“Some staff wouldn’t be able to tell some managers about what went wrong and what needs 
changing.” 
 
The operational staff stated that many of the operational managers did not have the respect 
of the staff and they wouldn’t consider them to be leaders. When questioned further, the 
interviewees suggested that many of the managers had no recent clinical experience yet they 
were expected to investigate and “judge staffs actions” when adverse clinical incidents 
occurred. The interviewees also felt that there was a lack of face to face presence for 
managers to be considered leaders.  The operational staff also felt that there was too much 
of a focus on performance by managers for them to act as true leaders in an open and fair 
way. The terms “militarised” and “command and control” were used to describe the style of 
management as a result of the focus on performance.   
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“There is too much focus on performance; it’s all about the times and not patient care.” 
 
In contrast, when some of the operational staff were first asked this question they went on 
to describe how their managers were very supportive at dealing with their individual 
problems such as access to physiotherapy or occupational health following injury or illness. 
An area that was identified by most interviewees was the lack of twenty four hours support 
for staff.  
 
The managers felt that the majority of operational managers did act in an open and fair 
manner but didn’t necessarily act as leaders. When asked why they didn’t consider them to 
be leaders three themes were identified: 
 
? Lack of investment in leadership education  
? Lack of capacity within the role to lead effectively 
? A perceived lack of support from senior managers 
 
“We don’t have professional managers or leaders, we have senior ambulance men.” 
 
When asked about leadership at more senior levels and other directorates within the Trust 
there were three distinct views: 
 
1. That there was excellent leadership from a corporate perspective, with “fresh faces” 
recruited from outside the Trust, providing a new “more open and professional” style of 
leadership that was less “operationally focussed”.   
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2. That much of the new senior management teams were too detached from the staff 
at lower levels, with a “distinct lack of visibility” in terms of being leaders. It was felt 
that communication of key corporate messages were also lost as a result. 
3. The increased size of the new Trust and having centralised corporate leaders/teams 
would potentially cause local leadership to suffer. 
 
Commentary 
60% of respondents from the SCQ disagreed that managers were viewed as leaders and 
only 34% agreed that managers communicated a clear vision of the organisation’s aims.  
Although, 56% of respondents in the SD agreed that they had clear planned goals and 
objectives for their job.  The lack of clinical competency and face to face presence of local 
managers appear to be the key reasons for them not to be considered leaders. The lack of 
twenty four hour support for staff is also an area of concern. 
 
Management generally support an open and fair culture but this is inconsistent across the 
operational groups, with more authoritarian approaches to management being applied.  
The focus on performance appears to limit a more open approach to leadership. Effective 
leadership is a key aspect of the learning organisation, particularly leaders modelling a 
culture of openness (Iles and Sutherland 2001). 
 
A lack of capacity and investment in education for management roles is another cause for 
the lack of leadership within the operational environment. Nationally, it is recognised that 
there has been a lack of investment in developing ambulance service management and that 
there needs to be an increased focus on developing leadership and organisational 
management skills (DH 2005).  
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It is evident however, that staff do feel supported by their manager when they encounter 
personal difficulties at work. The SD identified that 61% of respondents found their 
manager supportive in a personal crisis and 42% satisfied with the support provided. 51% 
of respondents from the SCQ agreed that their managers acted with sympathy and support 
when managing adverse incidents. These qualities are recognised as key components of 
effective leadership for learning organisations (Iles and Sutherland 2001). 
 
The large size of the new Trust and the tension between corporate and local management 
poses a risk to how effectively the open culture and visions of the Trust are communicated. 
The ability for organisations and leaders, to communicate a vision of learning is required 
for a learning organisation (Iles and Sutherland 2001).  
 
4.2.2 Objective 2: The development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
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Figure 24 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
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4h. Staff are encouraged to 
reflect on adverse incidents.  
(n = 173)                              
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Figure 26 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QL2.1 
Can you discuss how managers support learning and knowledge development from 
adverse incidents? 
The majority of interviewees said that managers were supportive of learning from adverse 
events. Use of the Untoward Incident Review Policy was cited as the principle reason 
behind this. However, it was felt that the learning being encouraged was simply re-
enforcement of existing policies and procedures as opposed to development of new 
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knowledge.  The operational staff and CPT  felt that although the managers supported the 
principle of learning they were not always fully supportive of what was required to facilitate 
the learning; in particular the reluctance to provide protected non-operational time for the 
learning to occur. Some of the managers also identified this as a “conflict” between 
operational performance pressures and learning. 
 
“Some managers will just take shortcuts and write to staff after an incident; telling them to do some 
learning and reflection or to read a policy. They won’t ask for any kind or review or feedback to prove that 
learning has occurred. As far as they are concerned they have covered themselves.” 
 
QL2.2 
Can you discuss how managers involve staff to suggest new ways of working? 
Some of the operational staff had experience of groups or forums and found them 
beneficial, although there was degree of scepticism that the same staff were always picked 
for the different groups, which limited the number of staff involved. The level of support 
from management for staff to attend the groups or forums was also varied.  
 
The lack of capacity within the operational environment was also cited as a reason why 
some operational managers were reluctant to release staff. This was attributed to a lack of 
support from an organisational perspective. 
 
“The Trust is right by trying to involve staff more but they keep asking for more and more out of 
operations without giving any additional funding or resources to support things like staff attending 
meetings or courses.” 
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All managers felt that they had ample opportunities to be involved with new ways of 
working and that their managers were very supportive of this.  
 
QL2.3 
How do managers support the sharing of knowledge? 
The majority of interviewees felt that most of the operational managers did not support the 
sharing of knowledge. The managers raised concerns that although knowledge may be 
shared at a local level, many Operational Managers did not share knowledge with other 
Operational Managers. The nature of the service and lack of capacity within management 
resources were attributed to this: 
 
“Only 25% of the workforce are on duty at any one time and even then they are out working in a 
mobile, unsupervised environment, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. This makes it extremely 
difficult for the current management to share knowledge or information effectively with staff - if they 
wanted to.”  
 
Commentary 
60% of staff in the SD felt that they were not involved in decisions affecting their work, 
with only 16% agreeing that managers actually try to involve staff in important decisions. 
The SCQ also supported this with only 34% of respondents agreeing the Trust was 
inclusive of staff when considering change. 61% of respondents also felt that managers 
were authoritarian, with only 31% agreeing managers acted democratically.  71.4% of the 
respondents however, agreed the concept of reflection was encouraged following adverse 
incidents, which is recognised as one of the skills that effective leaders should support (Iles 
and Sutherland 2001). 
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The semi-structured interviews revealed that managers were generally supportive of 
learning from adverse incidents, although the quality of learning and support for it to be 
undertaken effectively were questionable. Lack of capacity and lack of investment by the 
organisation to support this way of working were highlighted as reasons. Leaders of 
learning organisations should be encouraging the concepts of team learning, shared vision 
and openness when considering change (Senge 1990; Iles and Sutherland 2001)  
 
Operational Managers do not appear supportive of the sharing of knowledge, although this 
could be attributed to the nature of the operational environment.  Leadership is seen as key 
in supporting the sharing of knowledge, particularly when developing new systematic 
knowledge from combined explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
 
4.2.3 Objective 3: The organisation’s implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve performance. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
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Figure 27 
74 
Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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Figure 28 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QL3.1 
Can you discuss how committed managers and staff are to making changes or 
improvements as a result of adverse incidents? 
The majority of interviewees felt that senior managers were more committed to change 
than staff and Operational Managers. When asked why, all interviewees cited poor 
communication of information, which led to a lack of understanding why the change was 
required.  Another reason why staff were resistant to change was the Agenda for Change 
pay scheme, which was considered a significant barrier in terms of no financial incentive to 
encourage their personal development. Most interviewees felt that there was a commitment 
for action at an individual level but it wasn’t necessarily a change or improvement; it was 
simply a preventative measure.  
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Many of the interviewees felt that operational managers didn’t ‘manage’ change; they 
“simply passed information on”. It was also apparent that there was a lack of ownership by 
some operational managers. 
 
“Managers don’t always see the need to manage change; they just do the minimum, which is often sending a 
memo or instruction out.” 
 
QL3.2 
Can you discuss how staff are acknowledged or thanked when they make 
contributions to improving organisational performance? 
All interviewees stated that there was little or no acknowledgement of contributions. Some 
of the manager interviewees stated that their managers would say often thank you when 
pieces of work were completed. The sending of corporate emails to all staff containing 
thank you messages or letters from the Chief Executive was given as an example but 
considered insufficient.  
 
Commentary 
The results indicate that a commitment to making changes or improvements exists 
primarily at a senior management level, with a lack of ownership regarding change 
management at lower levels of management. This is one of the challenges of developing 
the operational knowledge from Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) Knowledge Conversion 
process; converting newly developed explicit knowledge back to tacit knowledge. Poor 
communication from senior management appears to be the key reason why there is a lack 
of ownership. Leaders communicating a shared vision and being open are two of the key 
elements to support organisational learning (Iles and Sutherland 2001; Senge 1990). Local 
management action also appears to be focused on individuals, with a little emphasis on 
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change or improvement. A unified view of learning (Brown and Dugdid 1991) and a team 
learning approach (Senge 1990) are also key for learning organisations.  
 
The SD showed that 62% of staff did not feel that they received clear feedback about how 
well they were doing their job, with 47% disagreeing that their immediate manager gave 
them clear feedback about their work. Only 24% agreed that their immediate manager did 
provide clear feedback. The SCQ results indicated that 75% of the respondents did not feel 
staff were acknowledged for contributing to learning or knowledge development. Only 
31% of the respondents agreed that staff were regularly provided with individual feedback 
following adverse incidents. Iles and Sutherland (2001) recognise, within human resource 
practices, the importance of having appraisal systems for staff and also incentives for 
individuals to contribute to organisational development.  Leadership is key to supporting 
these by being open and supportive to staff; encouraging them to learn and work towards 
the same vision (Iles and Sutherland 2001).  
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4.3 Structure 
4.3.1 Objective 1: The organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record 
adverse incidents. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
 
Q22d. On the whole, the different parts of the trust communicate 
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78 
Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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3a. The management structure supports the reporting of adverse incidents.
3b. The management structure supports an open and fair culture.
3c. The management structure supports sharing of information from operational level to management.
 
Figure 30 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QS1.1 
How would you describe the management structure in the Greater Manchester 
Area? 
The majority of interviewees described the operational management structure as; 
“hierarchical”, “rank based” and “command and control”. The operational staff felt that there 
were too many stages in the structure and that was insufficient first line management 
support. The operational staff also felt that the structure was too rigid and that they had to 
ask certain managers for certain things and too often managers had to speak to another 
manager to get authorisation to make a decision.  
 
Despite the criticisms, some of the interviewees felt that a hierarchical and rank based type 
of structure was required. The critical nature of the service provided, which is highly 
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dependant on the deployment of suitable resources, and the large geographical area 
covered were the principles reasons cited to support this view. 
 
“The command and control structure is a necessary evil to ensure that staff and resources are 
adequately managed to provide the right level of cover to hit our response time targets.”   
 
When the interviewees were asked about other directorates within the area they showed 
little understanding of what other structures looked like. The majority of managers felt that 
there was a still a hierarchical style of structure within each directorate with ‘heads of’ for 
each directorate. However, some stated that day to day business was conducted in a less 
structured way; more closely related to a matrix style structure.  
 
QS1.2 
Can you discuss how the structure supports the reporting of adverse incidents?  
All but one of the interviewees felt that the operational management structure was 
generally effective at supporting the reporting of adverse incidents. However, the lack of 
support outside of normal working hours was raised as a concern by the operational staff 
and some of the managers.  
 
“What happens if an incident occurs on a Friday night at 23-00? No real action is taken until 
the Operational Manager sees the incident report on the Monday morning. An Assistant 
Operational Manager or supervisor may support the individual at the time of incident but they will 
just leave it for the staffs ‘real’ manager to deal with later.” 
 
Concern was raised by one manager that the hierarchical structure within the operational 
directorate can often delay the reporting of incident information to other departments. 
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Interviewees were also asked what influence they thought the structure had on an open and 
fair culture. The majority of staff felt that the operational structure was not conducive to an 
open and fair culture due to the command and control style and that it led to a “top down” 
approach to information. One of the managers felt that the structure did not encourage 
staff to “question or query things enough”. 
 
Commentary  
64% of respondents in the SCQ agree that the structure supports the reporting of 
incidents, which was substantiated by the semi-structured interviews.  However, the lack of 
capacity within the structure and the lack of twenty four hour support are limiting factors. 
It was also identified that the hierarchical structure can delay the transfer of information to 
other directorates. The command and control style structure also appears to have an 
adverse effect on an open and fair culture. 59% of the SCQ respondents disagreed that the 
structure supported an open and fair culture, which was substantiated by the semi-
structured interviews. The knowledge creation process is dependant on being initiated by 
individual staff, with the organisation having the ability to mobilise the tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Structure is viewed a key component for the success of this 
process (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 2000).  Iles and Sutherland (2001) also suggest the 
structures should be flat to support effective information sharing and the openness 
required to involve staff more.  
 
Structures within other directorates appear to be hierarchical, with a tendency to work 
independently of each other. The SD highlighted that only 9% of respondents agreed that 
different parts of the Trust communicate effectively with each other. Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) suggest that tacit knowledge needs to be mobilised across directorate boundaries as 
part of an effective knowledge creation process.  
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4.3.2 Objective 2: The development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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3f. The structure provides formal opportunities (such as team meetings, forums etc) to share and discuss information with other staff.
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Comments in relation to Question 3e – examples of informal opportunities 
 
Current work levels permit very little free time for such discussion. 
I think operational staff on larger stations do get the opportunity to share experiences in an informal way 
– whether it is the type of issues you would want them to be sharing is another matter. 
Protected training time. KSF 
Staff have the opportunity to take time out after an adverse incident and can talk to AOM's.  
Too busy, too much pressure of work to even do own job. 
Whilst ambulances waiting at casualty for triage. When on station out of the system. Meals with other 
crews. 
Figure 33 
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Semi-structured Interview Results 
QS2.1 
How effective is the structure at supporting interaction, team working and 
networking to enable learning and knowledge development.  
All interviewees agreed the operational management structure was not supportive of staff 
interaction or team working. However, some of the interviewees attributed this to the 
nature of the service; that the majority of the workforce worked in pairs, in a mobile 
resource, with limited opportunity to interact formally with others. They felt that 
operational management had a tendency to focus only on their geographical area of 
responsibility, which led to limitations in terms of wider area working and information 
sharing. 
 
Another theme identified from the managers was a lack of capacity within the existing 
structure to release staff to participate in networking or team working opportunities.  One 
manager stated: 
 
“The current operational structure has been designed simply to put ambulances on the road and 
bums on seats. The structure is centred around staff and resource management and hitting 
performance targets. There is little capacity for these people to start working across networks on 
issues that aren’t seen to have a direct impact on these three things.” 
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The majority of managers felt that each directorate had a tendency to work in “silos”, with 
limited cross-over between functions. It was also felt that each directorate had a limited 
understanding of the other directorates. The majority of managers indicated that the 
directorates did work together when it was required. The Area Management Team was 
cited as a useful meeting forum that had improved cross-directorate working and 
knowledge sharing.   
 
Commentary 
80% of the respondents in the SD stated that they worked in a team, with 83% requiring 
team working to achieve objectives. However, only 25% said that the teams met regularly. 
The self-completion questionnaire data showed only 36% agreed that the structure 
supported team working, with 47% of respondents agreeing they had formal opportunities 
to share information with other staff.  Only 20% agreed they had informal opportunities to 
share or discuss information with other staff. Comments received from the SCQ indicated 
that opportunities were limited by work pressures. Learning organisations require 
structures that support team working and networking (Iles and Sutherland 2001).  
 
Different directorates appear to work independently of each other. Although some cross 
directorate working does occur, but predominantly through formally arranged groups or 
opportunities with staff having a poor understanding of other directorate’s functions. 
Flatter structures should support stronger lateral relations (Iles and Sutherland 2001), 
which in turn encourage greater systems thinking and team learning (Iles and Sutherland 
2001; Senge 1990).  
 
“Teams need to be firmly linked into the wider management structure to ensure that alliances 
within them do not hamper learning.” (DH 2000 p. 39) 
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Structure is also one of the components that support the interaction of individuals to 
develop systematic knowledge as part of the knowledge conversion process (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995; Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 2000).  
 
4.3.3 Objective 3: The organisation’s implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve performance. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
 
Q22b. Communication between management and staff is 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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Semi-structured Interview Results 
QS3.1  
How effective is the Greater Manchester area management structure at supporting 
the implementation of new ways of working/change or learning from adverse 
incidents? 
Most of the interviewees felt that the senior management structure was good at decision 
making to implement new learning from adverse incidents. However, one of the managers 
felt that the decision making process was often limited to the directorate involved, with 
little interaction with the directorates involved in the actual implementation. Two of the 
operational staff also raised concern that there was limited opportunity for staff to be 
involved in the initial decision making processes.  
  
87 
All interviewees expressed the view that the operational structure did not support the 
implementation of change or new initiatives particularly well. Lack of capacity within lower 
levels of management was the most frequently cited reason for this. The operational staff 
felt that the Clinical Practice Supervisor (CPS) role, which was considered first line 
management, was not effective enough because they were always operational and had no 
protected time to support new initiatives.  One manager stated that the operational 
command and control structure was not conducive to supporting “real change” since it was 
designed to focus primarily on resource management and performance issues.   
 
 “Quite often a memo or instruction will come out telling us about a change in a drug protocol or 
piece of equipment. There is hardly ever anybody available, who knows enough about it, to ask 
questions to. Or, if the memo goes missing there is nobody to ensure another one is printed…… I 
have found out about things weeks after the memo came out of the change happened.”  
 
The majority of interviewees acknowledged that the Clinical Practice Trainer (CPT) 
structure worked well when a significant change or new practice was required. This was 
attributed to the fact that the CPTs have protected time with staff to deliver training or 
education.  
 
Commentary 
54% of the respondents to the self completion questionnaire did not think that the 
management structure supported information sharing from management to operational 
level. The SD also showed that only 13% of the respondents agreed that communication 
was effective between management and staff.  
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The SCQ identified that only 29% of respondents agreed the organisation’s structure was 
flexible enough to meet changing needs. 77% agreed that the structure was fixed and 
bureaucratic, making it difficult to change. Iles and Sutherland (2001) suggest that 
structures should be flexible enough to respond to changes. The semi-structured interviews 
identified that the operational structure, lack of capacity at lower management levels and 
isolation from other directorates limited the ability to implement learning from less 
significant incidents. Lack of cross directorate working and staff involvement also limited 
the effectiveness of operational implementation. Flatter structures, improved employee 
involvement, teamwork and lateral relations are necessary for organisational learning (Iles 
and Sutherland 2001). Limited opportunity for face to face contact with management 
adversely affected the operational implementation process. Alder et al (1999) suggest that it 
is management’s role to support interaction of the organisation and individuals to share 
knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge conversion process, from systematic 
to operational, requires strong lateral relations to ensure that it is transferred effectively 
without risk of distortion or dilution.  
 
 
4.4 Human Resource Practices 
4.4.1 Objective 1: The organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record 
adverse incidents. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
 Yes No Don’t know
Q24b. Whistle-blowing - Is there a system to 
report such concerns confidentially? (n = 393) 
52% 10% 38% 
Figure 38 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
 Yes No 
1a. I know what an adverse incident is. (n = 173) 86.1% 13.9% 
1b. I know how to report an adverse incident. (n = 173) 83.3% 16.7% 
Figure 39 
 
n = 173
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Disagree Strongly
1d. Human resource policies and procedures encourage staff to be open and honest when reporting adverse incidents.
 
Figure 40 
 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QHR1.1 
Can you discuss how the human resource systems support the identification and 
reporting of adverse incidents? 
All interviewees acknowledged the Untoward Incident Review Policy as supportive in 
terms of encouraging staff to be open about adverse incidents. Many of the interviewees 
90 
also mentioned the Whistle-blowing Policy as supportive in terms of staff being able to 
report concerns in a confidential manner.  However, the operational staff said that many 
staff were still cautious of the open and fair context of the policies. Two of the operational 
staff felt that the human resource function was only ever utilised at the later stages of 
adverse incidents when staff were being disciplined; therefore staff associated human 
resource involvement with them being “in trouble”.  The lack of early human resource 
involvement was also associated with some operational management not using policies 
correctly and a blame culture being created. 
 
“There is no confidence among staff with regard to human resource policies providing support when 
things go wrong. I heard about a crew being sent a letter from their manager because they didn’t 
press the button to open the garage door quickly enough, when they answered a call to go on an 
emergency. One of the crew was a new starter who had only been here a couple of months. That will 
sit on their files now for twelve months.”     
 
The human resource manager stated that human resources were accessible to staff and 
managers but only a small number of staff would contact them directly, although the 
number was increasing. The human resource manager also said that he viewed the human 
resource function as being independent but this was probably not the perception of staff. 
Some of the managers felt that human resources were not pro-active enough at promoting 
their role in relation to adverse incidents. 
 
Commentary 
70% of the SCQ respondents agreed that human resource policies encourage staff to be 
open and honest when reporting adverse incidents. However, only 52% of the SD 
respondents were aware of a whistle-blowing system to report concerns, with 38% stating 
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they didn’t know. The SCQ identified the majority of staff knew what an adverse incident 
was (86.1%) and how to report one (83.3%).  
 
The semi-structured interviews identified that the lack of human resource involvement at 
the early stages of managing adverse incidents had limited the impact of policies supporting 
an open and fair culture. The lack of human resource involvement has also resulted in 
some managers using policies inappropriately. The role of human resources are probably 
not publicised enough to staff.  Human resource practices should ensure that people are 
considered to be the creators and users of organisational learning (Iles and Sutherland 
2001). Publicising individuals responsibilities for reporting adverse incidents and promoting 
the organisation’s role in ensuring staff are treated fairly are key to developing a reporting 
and learning culture (DH 2000).   
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 4.4.2 Objective 3: The organisation’s implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve performance. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
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60%
70%
Q7a. Have you had an appraisal or performance
development review in the last 12 months? (n =
383)
Q7b. Was your appraisal or performance
development review useful in helping you improve
how you do your job? (n = 163)
Yes No
 
Figure 41 
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Q8a. In the past 12 months, as part of your appraisal or performance development review, did you agree a Personal Development Plan? (n = 154)
Q8b. Have you received the learning, training and development that was identified in that plan? (n = 118)
Q8c. Has your immediate manager supported you in accessing this training, learning and development? (n = 118)
 
Figure 42 
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  Yes No Don’t know 
Not 
applicable
Q13b. Do you think the Agenda for Change 
re-banding you have received is fair? (n = 
395) 
26% 57% 13% 4% 
Figure 43 
 
 
Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
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1h. The Trust has an appraisal system that measures individual performance and encourages learning and the
development of new skills or knowledge.
7c. Feedback from adverse incidents is used as part of the Trust appraisal system.
 
Figure 44 
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1e. There are incentives to develop and share new knowledge or learning.
1f. The Trust actively encourages staff to learn and develop new knowledge.
1g. I have learned and developed new knowledge as a result of an adverse incident.
 
Figure 45 
 
Comments in relation to Question 1g – examples of learning from an adverse event 
 
As part of my job I read many incident reports of adverse incidents. I have identified the root cause of 
many of these incidents and learned from them. 
Complaining about staff attitudes in A&E have led to improvements hence better patient care. 
Directory of training. KSF. Incident management policy. Untoward incident policy. 
Learning and development courses on offer 
Obviously this is not a clinical example but we had a tribunal case which resulted from a system and 
procedure breakdown and we learned from that incident and reviewed and changed processes as a result, 
recognising that it was a systems failing. 
Figure 46 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QHR3.1 
What human resource systems are there in place to encourage staff to learn and 
develop new skills or knowledge? 
All interviewees mentioned the Untoward Incident Policy as a system that encourages 
individuals to learn from adverse events. However, many of the interviewees highlighted 
that the policy did not support the sharing of any learning.  
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The Knowledge and Skills Framework (KSF) was cited by the majority of interviewees as a 
process to encourage appraisal, learning and knowledge development. Two of the 
operational staff expressed concern however, that the KSF process was simply undertaken 
with staff as a “tick in the box” exercise. One member of staff stated: 
 
“Staff are suspicious of the KSF process since they have to meet with their line manager. They are 
often nervous and lacking in confidence since staff normally only meet with their manager when 
something is wrong.”  
 
The Risk and Safety Manager and the Human Resource Manager also highlighted that the 
KSF process was not linked well enough with adverse incident information to enable more 
systematic learning or knowledge development.  
 
Agenda for Change was cited by the majority of interviewees as having an adverse effect on 
staff wanting to participate in the KSF process. The interviewees highlighted the fact that 
majority of operational staff were at the top of their pay scale and there was no incentive to 
learn or develop. Limited opportunities for career development were also cited by two of 
the interviewees as negative influence on the KSF process.  
 
The Learning and Development Team, which sits within the Human Resources directorate, 
was also cited as being a valuable facility to support learning and knowledge development 
by the interviewees. The operational staff stated that lack of support from their local 
manager to get released form operational duties sometimes made it difficult to attend 
courses or development opportunities. The Sector Manager also acknowledged that the 
learning and development systems had not been “thought through properly” with no 
consideration of the impact on resource management.  
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Commentary 
62% of respondents to the SCQ agreed that the Trust actively encouraged staff to learn 
and develop new knowledge, with the same number agreeing that they had actually learned 
and developed new knowledge as a result of an adverse incident. The Untoward Incident 
Review Policy is effective in relation to adverse incidents at an individual level. The 
principles of the KSF process appear to be supportive of learning and knowledge 
development although additional policies or systems to improve support for staff release 
are required. The KSF is not linked sufficiently with learning from adverse incidents. Only 
17% of the SCQ respondents agreed that feedback from adverse incidents was used as part 
of the appraisal process. 
 
“Although most adverse events are not related to serious problems of poor professional performance, 
there must be appropriate links between systems for learning from failure and those for detecting 
and addressing poor performance.”  (DH 2000 p. 72) 
The SD showed that 43% of respondents had an appraisal during the last twelve months, 
with 61% finding the appraisal useful in improving how they do their job. 77% of 
respondents agreed a Personal Development Plan as part of the appraisal process, with 
52% agreeing that the identified training and development had been delivered (23% also 
stated that it was too early to confirm this). 58% of the respondents also agreed that their 
manager was supportive in accessing the training or development. The SCQ however, 
showed 49% of respondents agreed that there was an appraisal system that encouraged 
learning and the development of new skills.  
 
Only 43% of respondents to the SCQ agreed that there were incentives to develop and 
share new learning or knowledge. The SD also showed that 57% of respondents felt that 
their Agenda for Change pay band was unfair. The semi-structured interviews highlighted 
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the pay system and lack of career opportunities as having an adverse influence on the 
motivation for individuals to develop. The human resource practices should support 
individual learning, with appraisal and reward systems to support the sharing of knowledge 
and development of new skills (Iles and Sutherland 2001).  
 
 
4.5 Information Systems 
4.5.1 Objective 1: The organisation’s ability to recognise, identify and record 
adverse incidents. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
Q10e. Have you received any training, learning or development (paid for or 
provided by your trust) in Computer skills (e.g. using trust systems, 
internet, etc)? (n = 395)
Not applicable to 
me
6%
Yes, in the last 12 
months
12%
No
69%
Yes, more than 12 
months ago
13%
 
Figure 47 
 
 Yes No 
Q32c. I know how to report errors, near misses or incidents.  
(n = 392) 
86% 14% 
Figure 48 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
 Yes No 
1c. I know what information is required for documenting and 
reporting an adverse incident. (n = 173) 
72% 28% 
Figure 49 
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5a. The Trust has effective information systems for the management of adverse incidents (reporting through to; action, learning
and feedback).
5b. The Trust has efficient systems for the reporting and recording of adverse incidents. 
5c. I regularly have access to a computer in the workplace.
 
Figure 50 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QIS1.1 
Can you discuss the how effective the incident reporting system is for identifying 
and recording adverse events? 
All interviewees felt the incident reporting system was effective for the initial identification 
and recording of incidents, with a perception that all staff knew how to use the reporting 
system. The Human Resource Manager did however, feel that the reporting system was 
under utilised in other directorates. The majority of interviewees agreed that the form used 
99 
to record incidents was sufficient and easy to use. Some of the managers felt that a 
computer system would be better than the current paper-based one. Operational staff 
agreed that an electronic solution would be better but stated it would not work due to lack 
of access to computers.  The Risk and Safety Manager raised concern that the incident 
reporting system was geared towards recording actual incidents and not the recording or 
reporting of near misses. When the operational staff were asked about this they agreed and 
suggested that a different anonymous, simpler form would help the reporting of near 
misses by staff.  
 
One of the operational staff raised concern about the passing of the completed incident 
report form onto managers and that there were often long delays before feedback was 
received. Another operational staff member stated: 
 
“Most of the time nothing is done. The form goes into the manager’s office and you never hear 
anything again. People just fill the forms out to cover themselves.”     
 
When the managers were asked about the management of incident report forms they raised 
concern about a lack of consistency in how they were managed by different managers. The 
Sector Manager and Risk and Safety Manager felt that the process was correct but that 
some managers did not necessarily fulfil their responsibilities. Lack of ownership of the 
process, lack of investigation to “add value” to the information and delays in the transfer of 
information to other departments or managers were the main causes identified. The Sector 
Manager felt that delays in the transfer of the information related back to the issues 
associated with the operational management structure and how it had to be passed up 
through different levels of management. Other managers also felt that because the system 
was paper based it contributed to delays in the transfer of information between managers 
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and departments.  The majority of managers felt that an electronic incident reporting 
solution would resolve the concerns raised regarding the initial management of adverse 
incident information.  
 
Commentary 
The SD identified that 86% of respondents knew how to report an adverse incident, with 
72% of the SCQ respondents agreeing that they knew what information was required for 
reporting. The semi-structured interviews substantiated this; with the perception that all 
staff knew how to use the process although concern was raised about awareness outside 
the operational structure.   
 
“Detecting and accurately recording errors is a fundamental step in learning from experience” 
(DH 2000 p.38) 
 
56% of the SCQ respondents also agreed that the Trust had efficient systems for the 
reporting and recording of incidents.  However, the system was not considered as effective 
for the identification of near misses.   
 
“Safety information systems need to collect, analyse and disseminate information from incidents 
and near misses…….. research in industry demonstrated that for each accident causing serious 
injury, there were a far greater number of accidents which resulted in minor injuries or no injury at 
all – near misses.”  (DH 2000 p.38) 
 
The semi-structured interviews identified that an electronic solution would also help 
overcome some of the issues associated with the management of the adverse incident 
information; in particular reducing delays in the transfer of information. However, the lack 
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of access to computers was cited as a barrier to this. Although, the SCQ identified that 
72% of the respondents did have regular access to a computer in the workplace. The SD 
showed that 69% of respondents had not received any form of training in computer skills.   
 
The operational structure was also highlighted as a barrier to the transfer of timely adverse 
incident information. Only 31% of the SCQ respondents agreed that the Trust had 
effective systems for the management of adverse incidents. Iles and Sutherland (2001) state 
learning organisations require information systems that allow the rapid acquisition, 
processing and sharing of information to support knowledge management. These systems 
will also support the knowledge conversion process from tacit to explicit knowledge to 
provide conceptual knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).   
 
4.5.2 Objective 2: The development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
Q34f. We are informed about errors, near misses and incidents that 
happen in the trust. (n = 391)
Strongly Agree
2% Agree
20%
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree
36%
Strongly Disagree
9%
Disagree
33%
 
Figure 51 
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Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
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5d. I have access to email at work and regularly use it to communicate with other staff.
5e. The Trust provides a communication network for staff to share learning, knowledge or ideas. 
5g. The Trust provides systems/technology that allows staff to formally record new knowledge or ideas.
 
Figure 52 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QIS2.1 
Can you describe the types of information systems that you use to share 
information, learning or knowledge with others? 
The operational staff stated that they predominantly shared information verbally with other 
staff. The use of email was mentioned but lack of access to computers limited this method 
significantly. The operational staff also stated that many staff do not have work email 
addresses. The incident reporting system was mentioned by two staff as an information 
system used. The Clinical Practice Trainer (CPT) also said that they produced and 
circulated memos to staff to share information. The CPT also produced a newsletter, which 
was circulated to staff, providing them with an update on what was discussed at the Clinical 
Effectiveness Forum. However, this was limited to the operational group that the CPT 
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worked in. The lack of systems to communicate information upwards to management, 
other than incident reporting, was highlighted by the operational staff and CPT. 
 
“The communication of information in the service is non existent. It’s a one way process, downwards only. 
Meetings are called but do not happen due to lack of resources on the day. Staff are often given wrong 
information.” 
 
The managers provided many different examples of how they shared information or 
knowledge with others. Email was the most frequently cited method. Other methods 
included: 
 
? Newsletter articles  
? Memos 
? Staff forums 
? ‘Pigeon holes’ for staff  
? Trust Intranet site 
? Management Briefing Meetings 
 
The Risk and Safety Manager highlighted the use of a national web-based discussion 
forum, where information could be shared with other risk managers in other Ambulance 
Trusts.  
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QIS2.2 
Can you discuss your experience of how information is used from adverse events to 
develop knowledge or learning? 
All interviewees highlighted the Trust Untoward Incident Review process as an example of 
where information is used to develop new knowledge or learning. This however, was 
considered, by the majority of interviewees, to be limited to the individuals involved in the 
incident. The operational staff felt that the information communicated from adverse 
incidents was predominantly based on re-enforcement of existing policies or procedures. 
There was a perception by the majority of interviewees that information was only used 
from more severe incidents to develop learning or knowledge. The Risk and Safety 
Manager highlighted the use of information to learn from adverse incidents was primarily 
focused on the volumes and trends of incidents.  
 
“The paper-based reporting system, combined with a basic database system is time consuming and 
limits our ability to truly analyse and understand the data in anything more than numbers or 
trends. Because of this it is often only when a significant event occurs that we take time to really use 
information to develop new knowledge.”  
   
The majority of managers did feel that information from adverse incidents was used to 
support change or new ways of working. However, it was also acknowledged that it often 
took time to implement changes and the evidence behind the change was often lost in the 
process or not communicated sufficiently at the point of implementation.  
 
Commentary  
The information systems only appear to support the downward communication of 
information from management to staff. Only 28% of SCQ respondents agreed that the 
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Trust had systems or technology that allowed staff to formally record new knowledge or 
ideas. Iles and Sutherland (2001) highlight the requirement for organisations to be able to 
rapidly acquire and process information. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge 
conversion process, where explicit knowledge is combined to form systemic knowledge, is 
also dependant on the organisations ability to mobilise knowledge. The semi-structured 
interviews highlighted a lack of access to Information Technology facilities as a significant 
barrier to the upward communication of information from an operational level.  In 
contrast, 72% of the SCQ respondents agreed that they had access to email at work. 
Managers cited email as their most commonly used method of information sharing. Many 
of the other information systems used by management appear to be verbal or paper-based 
and focussed on the downward communication of information to staff. 
 
The use of information to learn or develop new knowledge  limited to individuals or when 
a significant incident occurs. The SD showed that only 22% of respondents agreed that 
they were informed about near misses and errors that happen. The information from 
adverse incidents is predominantly used to re-enforce existing procedures. Iles and 
Sutherland (2001) suggest that learning organisations need to progress from single loop 
learning where information is used for control purposes.  
 
“It is far more difficult for effective learning to take place if the initial understanding of what has 
occurred is seriously flawed.” (DH 2000 p.29) 
 
Limitations in the information systems used for incident reporting appear to limit the 
capacity to develop quality information to support knowledge development. The proper 
analysis of data is required to ensure that learning can be identified (DH 2000).  
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4.5.3 Objective 3: The organisation’s implementation of new learning and 
knowledge to improve performance. 
 
Secondary Data Results 
Q34g. We are given feedback about changes made in respose to 
reported errors, near misses and incidents. (n = 391)
Strongly Agree
2% Agree
24%
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree
40%
Strongly Disagree
8%
Disagree
26%
 
Figure 53 
 
Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
n = 173
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7d. The organisation considers information from adverse incidents when developing new services, policies or procedures.
7e. The organisation communicates what learning or changes have occurred as a result of adverse incidents.
 
Figure 54 
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5f. The Trust provides systems/technology that allows staff to search and retrieve 
stored knowledge or information. (n = 173)
Agree Strongly
9%
Agree
45%
Disagree
40%
Disagree Strongly
6%
 
Figure 55 
 
Semi-structured Interview Results 
QIS3.1 
Can you discuss your experience/knowledge of how information systems support 
the implementation of new knowledge i.e. its documentation and communication 
to staff? 
All the interviewees agreed that the organisation was good at producing information but 
concern was raised about how effectively it was communicated to staff. The operational 
interviewees cited paper-based systems such as Paramedic Emergency Service Instructions, 
Clinical Handbooks and Self Directed Learning packs as the most common methods they 
had experience of. The biggest concern raised however, was that not all staff see or read 
the memos. Two reasons were identified for this: 
 
1. Because the memos are paper-based they had a tendency to go missing easily, with 
only one copy sent out per station. It was also mentioned that some staff would 
keep the memo for themselves, which meant nobody else was able to read it.  
108 
2. Many staff don’t proactively check for new information and there was no system to 
ensure that, when information was issued, they were made aware and actually read 
it.  
 
The CPT highlighted an area of good practice in one operational group where every 
member of staff was provided with a ‘pigeon hole’. Any new information was then copied 
to all staff via the ‘pigeon hole’ system. Two of the operational staff also mentioned glass 
fronted notice boards on stations which were used to display all Paramedic Emergency 
Service Instructions. However, ensuring staff actually read them or that they were aware of 
a new instruction being displayed was still considered an issue.   
 
“I'm sure the Trust/Management has good intent, however due to the size of the organisation, 
communication is very slow and not always a two way, process, which leads to misunderstanding 
and mistrust. Incidentally, I feel the Unions are no better in this respect.” 
 
The Self Directed Learning packs and Clinical handbooks were considered effective by the 
majority of interviewees for ensuring that staff had received the information since these 
were issued using staff lists where they had to sign for receiving them. It was also felt that 
these were used by staff as a reference document. However, the managers and CPT were 
concerned that there was no follow process to ensure that they had read the information, 
understood it and used it.  
 
The managers raised concern about the large volume of information that was 
communicated to operational staff. It was felt that not enough time was spent at a local 
level managing the communication element, which was mainly attributed to operational 
performance pressures. The Sector Manager also raised concern that staff had limited 
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opportunity or facilities to feedback or raise questions in relation to the information 
communicated down.  
 
“We are good at sending information out but we can’t ensure that every member of staff reads it and 
understands it every time. What happens if a Paramedic comes on duty at 19-00 at night, reads a new 
instruction and then has some questions about it? Who can he ask? Who can he speak to that will be fully 
briefed and knowledgeable about the change?”  
 
The majority of managers agreed that information systems were generally effective in 
supporting their roles at a management level. Email and the Trust intranet site were the 
two most cited examples. The Human Resource Manager felt that a lot of information 
about new operational changes was not circulated enough to other directorates. The 
managers also highlighted a number of face to face opportunities, such as the Management 
Briefing Meetings (MBMs), as useful information systems to support implementing change. 
However, it was acknowledged that these were for management only and there was limited 
opportunity within the operational environment to cascade the information in a similar 
manner.  
 
Commentary 
Only 26% of the SD respondents and 29% of the SCQ respondents agreed that feedback 
was communicated in relation to changes made as a result of adverse incidents. The semi-
structured interviews also identified that little background information was communicated 
as part of the implementation process. However, 60% of the SCQ respondents agreed that 
the organisation considers information from adverse events when developing new service 
or procedures.  
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The information systems supporting implementation at an operational level are not 
particularly robust. Ensuring staff have read the information and understand it are the two 
key issues. The final part of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge conversion process 
is the creation of operational knowledge by converting explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge using documents, procedures diagrams etc. The ability for staff to feedback up 
the information system is also a concern that may limit the organisation’s ability to learn 
about the impact of the change and also the effectiveness of its information systems. 
Failure to embed learning sufficiently into practice is one of the most common reasons 
why learning from adverse incidents fails (DH 2000). 
 
54% of the SCQ respondents agreed that the Trust provided systems/technology to search 
and retrieve stored knowledge or information. The ability of to share information rapidly is 
a characteristic of learning organisations (Iles and Sutherland 2001).  
 
Information systems at a management level do seem to be more effective, which is 
primarily attributed to improved access to IT facilities and greater opportunity to 
participate in face to face communications.  
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4.6 Communities of Practice 
4.6.2 Objective 2: The development of new knowledge and learning from 
information within the organisation. 
 
 
Secondary Data Results 
 
Yes No 
Q15d. Does the team meet regularly to discuss its effectiveness 
and how it could be improved? (n = 308) 
25% 75% 
Figure 56 
 
Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
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6a. The Trust supports the interaction of individual and organisation to share and build knowledge.
6b. The Trust has established forums or groups that are designed to share knowledge and learning.
 
Figure 57 
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Comments in relation to Question 6b – examples of groups or forums 
 
Clinical Effectiveness Forum x 3 
Certain groups exist, maybe more feedback from these groups to staff could be done. 
KSF. Introduction and education for all staff. 
Mandatory training groups / individual PDP's 
Performance consultation group and vehicle working party. 
Figure 58 
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6a. The Trust supports the interaction of individual and organisation to share and build knowledge.
6b. The Trust has established forums or groups that are designed to share knowledge and learning.
6c. Managers encourage staff to attend forums or groups.
6d. Managers provide support for staff to attend forums or groups.
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Semi-structured Interview Results 
QCP2.1 
Can you discuss how the organisation supports the interaction of individuals to 
share and build knowledge? 
Two of the operational staff referred to the Clinical Effectiveness Forum as an example of 
how the organisation supported individuals coming together to develop knowledge. 
Concern was expressed by one interviewee however, that membership was limited to only 
one member of staff from each operational group. The Clinical Practice Trainer (CPT) 
referred to the operational study days as an opportunity that the organisation had created 
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for staff to come together. Staff forums were also cited as an example of an opportunity 
where staff could meet with management.  
The Sector Manager felt that the organisation supported the principle of individuals 
interacting to develop knowledge but that they hadn’t supported it from the perspective of 
providing additional resources to allow the release of staff. The Human Resource Manager  
and Risk and Safety Manager were able to give several examples of how the organisation 
supported the interaction of individuals including the Black, Minority and Ethnicity Group, 
Equality and Diversity Working Group and the Manual Handling Working Group.  The 
Area Director referred to focus groups that were being utilised to develop and implement 
the Trust’s vision.  
 
QCP2.2 
What opportunities exist – in relation to adverse incidents – for staff to share and 
develop knowledge? 
All interviewees cited the Untoward Incident Review process but stated that it was limited 
to the individuals involved in the incident. One of the operational staff referred to the 
Maternity Guidelines Group. None of the interviewees were able to identify any 
opportunities where operational staff or management could meet in relation to adverse 
incidents. One operational member of staff and the CPT suggested that staff had informal 
opportunities in the mess room or outside hospitals to share and develop knowledge.  
 
QCP2.3 
How would you describe the level of support that is provided by managers for staff 
to be part of knowledge sharing activities? 
Two out of the three operational staff felt their managers were supportive of in terms of 
attending forums or meetings. The support included payment of overtime on days off, 
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assistance with swapping shifts or time back in lieu. The CPT acknowledged that they were 
given a high level of support by their training manager to participate in meetings or forums. 
One operational member of staff said that operational performance was the only concern 
of their manager and there was little support for attending meetings. The Sector Manager 
highlighted the lack of organisational support to allow managers to be supportive in this 
respect.  
 
“There is too much of a reliance on the good will of managers to juggle limited resources to release staff to 
attend. We are only funded to meet performance targets, with little or no capacity in the system to undertake 
what are not seen as core tasks. If they want a consistent approach then they need to fund it properly.” 
 
Concern was raised by all managers about the conflict between operational performance 
pressures and the release of staff to participate in meetings or forums. One manager 
suggested that the Operational Managers may be more supportive of staff participating in 
groups if they were given greater support to participate themselves.  
 
QCP2.4 
Are staff encouraged to use the concepts of enquiry, reflection and experience when 
sharing knowledge? 
The majority of interviewees agreed that the concepts were really only ever encouraged on 
an individual basis as part of the work-based training system and the Untoward Incident 
Review. One of the operational staff felt the Clinical Effectiveness Forum functioned on 
the basis of these concepts. The CPT stated that they tried to encourage these concepts to 
be used more openly as part of the training days that staff attend.  
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The managers all stated that they tried to use these concepts themselves and were 
supportive of other staff using them also. The Human Resource Manager suggested that 
the Knowledge and Skills Framework should support the use of these concepts at an 
individual level through appraisals.  
 
QCP2.5 
How effective is the organisation at developing new knowledge from networks or 
groups of staff in this context? 
The majority of interviewees thought that the organisation was effective at developing new 
knowledge from groups. Two main concerns raised by operational staff were; the time it 
took to introduce changes and lack of ability to ensure all staff actually change their 
practice. The operational staff and CPT also suggested that there was insufficient 
promotion of the groups used to develop new knowledge or practice and this may help 
encourage other staff to adopt the changes more readily.   
 
The managers felt that the organisation was better at developing knowledge when engaged 
with external networks or groups. This was partly attributed to the fact that these were 
higher profile initiatives, with some additional funding attached. Concern was also raised by 
the majority of managers about how knowledge was then shared and implemented with 
operational staff. The lack of capacity within the operational management structure was the 
most frequently cited reason for this.    
 
Commentary 
The SCQ showed that only 37% of the respondents agreed that Trust supported the 
interaction of individuals and the organisation to share and develop knowledge. However, 
the semi-structured interviews provided many examples of opportunities that the Trust had 
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provided for staff interact. The SCQ also highlighted that 73% of respondents felt 
confident to discuss issues in an open manner within the forums.  It was identified that 
although the principle of staff participation was supported there needed to greater support 
in terms of resource provision. There is limited evidence of any opportunities for staff to 
share or develop knowledge from adverse incidents. The development of systematic 
knowledge from Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge conversion process is highly 
dependant on the interaction of individuals within an organisation.  
 
The SCQ indicated that only 28% of respondents felt their manager encouraged them to 
attend forums or groups with only 26% of respondents agreeing that their manager 
provided support for them to attend. The SD also identified that only 25% of respondents 
agreed their team met regularly to discuss its effectiveness and how it could be improved.  
The semi-structured interviews identified that some managers were supportive of staff 
attending groups but there were inconsistencies in the levels of support offered. This was 
attributed to the lack of investment in additional resources and the conflict with 
operational performance pressure.  A lack of participation, and therefore understanding, by 
Operational Managers was another barrier. The provision of an infrastructure and 
resources by organisations is identified as one of the ways that communities of practice can 
be supported (Wenger and Snyder 2000).  Management also have a role in helping cultivate 
communities of practice (Wenger and Snyder 2000) and to support the interaction of 
individuals and the organisation to share and develop new knowledge (Alder et al 1999).  
  
57% of the SCQ respondents agreed that the concepts of enquiry, reflection and 
experience were used within forums or groups.   All interviewees also agreed that these 
concepts were encouraged and used by most staff. However, the semi-structured interviews 
identified this was considered to be at an individual level, which limited wider 
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organisational knowledge development. Dewey’s (1966) concepts of enquiry, reflection and 
experience are considered to enhance the way communities of practice function (Elkjaer 
2006).   
 
The development of knowledge from networks or groups was considered to effective 
although the time taken to implement and lack of communication about the knowledge 
development process were identified as limiting factors. The skill of putting knowledge into 
practice is considered as a core competency for learning organisations (Brown and Duguid 
1998). 
 
 
 
4.7 Evaluation of Findings 
 
One of the most significant findings was that of an individual learning culture, which 
limited the recognition of less severe incidents and was primarily centred on single loop 
learning. There was also some evidence of a blame culture within the operational 
environment despite an open and fair culture in senior management and other directorates.  
 
It became apparent that the culture, structure and leadership elements of the framework 
were closely linked; with the latter two having a significant influence on the culture. The 
hierarchical structure and the lack of effective leadership within the operational 
environment do not support team working and learning. It also appears ineffective at 
communicating the open and fair culture promoted by senior management. The 
performance focussed nature of the service is wrongly perceived to be incongruent with a 
more open style of leadership required for a learning organisation.  The nature of the 
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service delivered (a mobile unsupervised workforce operating in pairs) does however, 
present significant challenges in terms of developing an affordable structure and leadership 
model to support organisational learning.  The framework also identified that the 
relationship between organisational learning and improving organisational performance was 
not fully understood. 
 
The research identified the importance of information systems in supporting all aspects of 
the process. The most significant finding was the importance of a two way information 
system, which was not sufficiently emphasised in the literature or conceptual framework. 
The information systems were also significantly influenced by the structure of directorates. 
The limited ability of the organisation to provide effective feedback to staff and to 
communicate the culture or vision from senior management had a negative influence on 
creating a learning culture. 
  
The human resource element of the framework did identify systems to encourage learning 
and personal development. However, the link between individual learning and 
organisational learning was not apparent. The human resource element appears highly 
dependant on effective leadership and information systems to support the relationship 
between individual and organisation.   
 
The research identified that the knowledge conversion process does fit with the different 
aspects of managing adverse incidents. However, this again is highly dependant on 
structure and leadership supporting both the mobilisation of knowledge from individuals, 
through a culture of openness, and opportunities for staff to learn and develop knowledge 
collectively. The concept of communities of practice also appears to support the 
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knowledge development process but again is incongruent with a predominantly mobile 
workforce.   
 
The importance of a vision to support organisational learning is discussed within the 
literature and identified within the research. However, it was evident that this was not 
sufficiently communicated or embedded within the culture, which was partially attributed 
to an overarching focus of operational performance. Inclusion of vision as an element of 
the conceptual framework may prove beneficial. 
 
In light of the research findings it has been necessary to review and modify the conceptual 
framework. Figure 60 represents the revised conceptual framework.  
 
The framework now demonstrates that leadership, structure and vision influence the 
culture and that culture has a greater role in enabling each of the stages. Information 
systems are also represented as two way and as an integral part of each stage. The 
information systems and culture are also seen as key in communicating the vision of the 
organisation - to learn and develop knowledge collectively.  
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Figure 60: Revised Conceptual Framework for learning from adverse incidents  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following conclusions have been drawn from the findings presented in chapter four 
and are discussed in relation to the six elements of the conceptual framework. They are 
presented in descending order of importance. 
 
5.1 Structure 
The structure, at an operational level, is the most significant limiting factor in relation to 
achieving organisational learning. The hierarchical command and control structure is not 
conducive to the team based approach required. However, even if this was resolved there 
are still the physical constraints and working patterns in relation to the nature of the 
service, which would limit effective team working. There is also a lack of capacity within 
the current structure to provide adequate leadership and to release staff from operational 
duties; allowing them to participate more in the organisations activities and to function 
more effectively as teams.  The lack of provision of twenty four hour management support 
to staff appears to be a concern for both staff and managers.  
 
The current operational structure only appears to support a one way communication 
process from management to staff; however, the effectiveness of this is limited by a lack of 
capacity at first line management levels. More significantly, the rank based structure appears 
to inhibit staff from challenging practices or procedures or generally communicating 
information back up to management. The operational structure is also too isolated from 
other directorates, which limits and delays the sharing of information. Additionally, there is 
evidence to suggest that cross directorate communication and working, as a whole, could 
be greatly improved within the organisation.  
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5.2 Leadership 
There is evidence of effective leadership at a senior level within the organisation; however, 
the translation of this to lower levels of the organisation is adversely affected by the size of 
the new organisation and the relationship between corporate and local area management. A 
lack of clinical competency and lack of investment by the organisation in education and 
development for Operational Managers has led to a lack of respect from clinical staff and 
inconsistencies in the way that managers behave. This has also resulted in an inability to 
understand and learn from more complex clinical incidents. Re-enforcement of existing 
policies or practice by managers appears to be the pre-dominant approach to what is 
considered learning i.e. single loop learning.  
 
The operational performance pressures appear to limit the perceived scope for a more 
open and inclusive approach to leadership within the operational directorate, which have 
led to a more authoritarian approach to managing staff.  Failure by lower levels of 
management to link learning from adverse incidents to improving overall organisational 
performance is also apparent. The lack of face to face opportunities with management 
appears to be contributory factor to why leadership is not perceived to be effective at an 
operational level. The current concerns over the next stages of the re-structure process 
have also had an adverse effect on the motivation of lower levels of management, which 
may impact on their behaviour as leaders. 
 
5.3 Culture 
Despite evidence of the Trust supporting an open and fair culture there is still a degree of 
scepticism among staff with evidence of a perceived blame culture. As a result, incident 
reporting is primarily driven by a culture of self preservation, focusing on incidents that 
directly affect staff and have to be reported. Little consideration is given to near misses and 
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the linking of individual incidents to wider organisational issues. An individualistic learning 
culture is also prevalent that focuses on the re-enforcement of existing practices. There is 
also a distinct lack of a questioning culture within the organisation. The predominant 
performance culture within the operational directorate is a limiting factor, which does not 
support a collective learning culture, particularly between operational managers.  Trust 
policy, in relation to learning and action from adverse incidents, has created a culture of 
confidentiality, which has prevented individuals or the organisation to share any learning or 
knowledge developed. Agenda for Change has also resulted in poor staff morale and had a 
negative influence in terms of being motivated to learn or develop more.   
 
There was evidence of a knowledge sharing culture at an informal level between 
operational staff, with evidence of some learning being shared. However, the organisations 
ability to capture this is limited. Management’s failure to recognise this as valuable 
knowledge or information that is worthy of capturing is a concern.      
 
A systems thinking culture is apparent at more senior levels within the organisation with a 
commitment to being open and fair. A culture of action to implement new learning or 
knowledge is also apparent at a senior level within the organisation. However, poor 
communication has limited this culture becoming more widespread. There is some 
evidence of learning, change and action as a result of more serious incidents. The quality of 
implementation is however, a concern. Much of this can be attributed to the issues 
associated with structure and leadership previously discussed.  
 
5.4 Information Systems 
The information systems to support incident reporting are effective from an operational 
perspective; the system is easy to access and use and collects the correct information.  
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However, the system does not support the reporting of near misses due to lack of 
anonymity and a simpler recording process. The transfer and management of information 
within operational management are not effective. There are two principle reasons for this; 
the need to transfer up through a hierarchical structure, which causes delays and the limited 
ability by managers to improve the quality of the information. There is also evidence of 
delays in transferring information across directorates. The introduction of an electronic 
incident reporting system was widely acknowledged as an effective solution to improve the 
rapid transfer of information. However, a lack of access to Information Technology (IT) 
equipment by operational staff has limited the ability to move from a paper-based system 
to an electronic solution.  
 
The use of information systems to support sharing of knowledge, at a management level, 
does appear to be effective with evidence of a variety of methods being utilised. 
Information systems, at an operational level, are much less effective with a lack of systems 
to support the transfer of information upwards to management.  The use of information 
systems to develop knowledge or learning from adverse incidents is a time consuming 
process due to the paper-based reporting system. The lack of sophisticated analysis also 
appears to limit the development of the information into anything other than trend or 
volume analysis of incidents.   
 
There is evidence of knowledge from adverse incidents being used to effect change or 
develop practice. However, there is a failure of information systems to support the 
downward communication of feedback from adverse incidents and the implementation of 
learning in general. The inability of information systems to support the upward 
communication of feedback, following implementation, prevents the organisation gaining 
assurance that all staff been provided with the correct information. This also limits the 
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organisations ability to assess how effective implementation has been and the impact of any 
changes made. The reliance on paper-based systems to implement change appears to be a 
contributory factor to these issues. A ‘pigeon hole’ system was identified as an example of 
good practice that ensured every member of staff was provided with a copy of paper-based 
communications. Improved access to IT and the use of electronic learning solutions may 
overcome some of the issues identified. It is also apparent that the effectiveness of 
information systems is influenced by the structure and leadership within the organisation. 
 
5.5 Human Resource Practices 
The human resource policies are supportive of an open and fair culture that supports the 
reporting of adverse incidents. However, the confidential nature of the policies and an 
emphasis on management of individuals does not support organisational learning and the 
sharing of knowledge. The application of the policies by Operational Managers is 
inconsistent and has led to some concerns over their effectiveness. Human resources are 
underutilised in the management of adverse incidents and their independent role is not 
publicised well enough to staff. This has led to a negative association with their 
involvement when they are utilised.  
 
Learning and knowledge development is supported at an individual level by the human 
resource policies in relation to adverse incidents. The Knowledge and Skills Framework 
(KSF) and the Learning and Development Team are also very supportive of learning and 
development however; they are not sufficiently linked with information from adverse 
incidents to support organisational learning. There is evidence of appraisals being 
undertaken and staff being supported to access further training or development. However, 
this is limited by the lack of capacity within the operational structure to release staff.  
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Further work is required to develop organisational policy to ensure that staff are adequately 
supported in terms of release to participate in learning and development. Similarly, further 
work is required to assess the full impact of supported learning activities in terms of the 
required operational resources. The Agenda for Change pay scheme and the lack of career 
opportunities has had a negative influence on the majority of the operational workforce in 
terms of being motivated to learn and develop more skills. It is recognised however, that 
this is a national pay scheme and is out with the direct control of the organisation.  
 
5.6 Communities of Practice 
There was some evidence of groups that the organisation had established to support the 
interaction of staff to develop new knowledge or ways of working. These appear to be 
effective, with evidence of the organisation implementing the knowledge or learning 
developed from working groups or forums. However, excessive time taken to implement 
changes and the lack of communication regarding the role of the groups or forums in 
developing the change is not communicated sufficiently.  
 
There was no evidence of self-forming groups or groups in relation to adverse incidents. 
The nature of the service significantly limits the ability of groups to self form. The level of 
support offered by managers for staff to attend established groups or forums was varied, 
which was attributed to the lack of capacity within the operational structure.  
 
The concepts of enquiry, reflection and experience appear to be embedded at an individual 
level and also within the established working groups or forums. Staff are also confident to 
act in an open and honest manner when attending forums or groups. The principles of 
communities of practice are evident within existing working groups and forums. These 
principles could be used to good effect to collectively review adverse incident information 
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and develop new knowledge and learning. However, increased capacity within the 
organisational structure and more effective information systems, to improve the quality of 
information, is required to maximise the benefits of such a group.  
 
5.7 Further research 
Further research is required in relation to the cultural aspects of the organisation with 
particular focus on understanding the dominant operational performance orientated culture 
and the failure to link this with other aspects of organisational performance.  
 
More in-depth research in relation to the information needs of the organisation and 
identification of suitable communication methods would also prove beneficial in the 
context of organisational learning.   
 
Additional research to identify and understand, in more detail, the factors affecting staff 
motivation to support organisational learning and personal development is recommended. 
 
Lastly, it is recommended that further research is undertaken in the other two areas of the 
Trust, using the conceptual framework, to provide a more accurate understanding of the 
whole organisations ability to learn.   
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following recommendations are presented in descending of importance: 
 
6.1 
A full review of the operational management structure is undertaken; to provide greater 
capacity for management to support staff and provide more effective leadership. 
Consideration must be given to the flattening of the operational management structure and 
increasing the first line management resource; particularly twenty four hour support. This 
would greatly improve the level of contact with staff, provide an opportunity for two-way 
communication and reduce some of the delays in transferring information. An additional 
part of the review should focus on levels of authority, empowering lower levels of 
management to make more decisions and communicate more laterally with other 
directorates. A Scheme of Delegation to clearly define management roles in different 
scenarios may assist with this.     
 
6.2 
The capacity within the operational directorate should be reviewed in relation to current 
levels of demand. Specific consideration should be given to identifying what capacity is 
required and what capacity there is to release staff from operational duty to participate in 
activities to develop organisational knowledge and activities to support their own personal 
learning and development.  
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6.3 
A review of management’s development needs should be undertaken once 
recommendation 6.1 has been completed. This should include identification of the required 
competencies for effective leadership and the appropriate educational pathways to support 
development.  A timetable for delivery of the educational programmes should also be 
developed. 
 
6.4 
A business case, for submission to the Trust Board should be produced following 
completion of recommendations 6.1 to 6.3. This should outline associated costs, 
timescales, benefits, risks and measures of success.  
 
6.5 
The Trust should purchase an electronic incident reporting system. This would operate 
concomitantly with the paper-based system. Staff could utilise the electronic reporting 
solution where facilities exist. A simplified near miss form could also be developed as an 
option on the electronic system. Management could also utilise the system to transfer 
information from paper, which would facilitate much more rapid sharing of information 
across the organisation. The electronic solution would provide staff and management with 
the ability to monitor the progress of reported incidents; thus overcoming some of the 
issues associated with poor feedback from paper-based systems. The electronic solution 
would also facilitate improved analysis and reporting of incident data.  
 
6.6 
The Trust should develop an Organisational Learning Strategy and Policy, which clearly 
signals it’s commitment to developing the qualities and systems associated with a learning 
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organisation.  This should provide the Trust with a vision that positively influences the 
culture at all levels within the organisation. The document should focus on using 
information and knowledge from all aspects of the organisation, not just adverse incidents. 
It should make explicit the link between knowledge development and improving overall 
organisational performance. The document should be developed by a small working group 
that incorporates representatives from all directorates, including operational staff.   
 
6.7 
The Trust should review its current Untoward Incident Policy to support the sharing of 
learning outcomes at the end of the review process. The emphasis should be on anonymity 
and the development of themes to be shared with the wider organisation.  
 
6.8 
The Trust should implement a simplified near miss form that allows staff to report quickly 
and easily with the option of anonymity.  
 
6.9 
An Incident Review Forum should be developed, using the principles of communities of 
practice, to collectively develop learning and knowledge from adverse incidents, complaints 
and claims. This forum should also review outcomes form the untoward incident review 
process. Membership of the group should include representation from all directorates, 
including operational staff. The forum should produce a quarterly ‘Lessons Learned’ 
newsletter for staff.  
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6.10 
The Trust should review the Knowledge and Skills Framework process to ensure that 
adverse incident information is considered as part of the appraisal process. 
 
6.11 
The Trust should undertake an audit of current availability to IT equipment for operational 
staff, including the provision of work email addresses for staff. The audit should also assess 
the number of staff who require computer training. 
 
6.12 
A Quality Improvement Portal should be developed on the Trust Intranet site to support 
the sharing of and development of information between staff. The principle aspect of the 
portal would be a forum where staff can raise issues for discussion with other staff 
including managers. This would allow the organisation to ‘listen’ to what staff concerns are 
and to provide some immediate responses where appropriate. The forum would be 
managed by the organisation to limit any inappropriate use by both staff and management. 
The organisation would be able to identify themes or areas of concern that require further 
investigation. Another aspect of the portal would be to act as a ‘one stop’ information 
source. Adverse incident information, clinical guidelines, staff memos, newsletters, clinical 
audit reports, online training packs and web-links to external resources could be stored 
here.  
 
6.13 
The following implementation plan (Table 9) provides an outline of the anticipated costs 
and timescales involved.  
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Table 9: Implementation Plan 
Action Plan Updated: 1
st September 
2007 Author: Stephen Barnard, Head of Clinical Governance 
Task 
No. Task Actions 
Lead 
Person 
Time 
required 
Expected  
Completion 
Date 
Costs 
1. 
To undertake a full review of the 
Operational Management Structure 
to provide greater capacity for 
management to support staff and 
provide more effective leadership. 
 
1. Use Mersey Internal Audit to undertake review of 
current structure. 
2. Involvement of finance to identify cost implications. 
3. Presentation of report to Trust Executive Team. 
4. Consultation with operational management staff. 
5. Presentation of final report to Trust Board.  
Deputy 
Chief 
Executive 
3 months 
1st 
December 
2007 
Cost of Mersey Internal 
Audit is covered by a 
Service Level Agreement. 
There is currently spare 
capacity within the 
agreement for them to 
undertake additional 
activities such as this.  
 
Cost of changes to 
management structure not 
yet known. 
2. 
The capacity within the operational 
directorate is to be reviewed in 
relation to current levels of 
demand. Specific consideration 
should be given to identifying what 
capacity is required and what 
capacity there is to release staff 
from operational duty to participate 
in activities to develop 
organisational knowledge and 
activities to support their own 
personal learning and
development.  
 
6. Presentation of report to Trust Executive 
Management Team.   
 
1. Analysis of current activity and demand for the 
financial year. 
2. Mapping of current staffing levels and against the 
activity levels. 
3. Involvement of finance to identify costs of 
additional resources required. 
4. Presentation of report to Area Management Team. 
5. Consultation with staff. 
Head of 
Service 2 months 
1st 
November 
2007 
Nil cost for the analysis work 
– only management time.  
 
Cost of additional resources 
not yet known. 
3. 
A review of management’s 
development needs should be 
undertaken once task 1 has been 
completed. This should include 
identification of the required 
competencies for effective
leadership and the appropriate 
 
3. Identification of suitable academic and non-
academic programmes to develop key skills and 
competencies.  
1. Identify the key kills and competencies required to 
fulfil the new management roles from task 1.  
2. Development of competency frameworks for each 
of the roles. 
Associate 
Director of  
Workforce 
Develop-
ment 
3 months 1
st March 
2008 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
 
Cost of additional education 
and training not yet known. 
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Action Plan Updated: 1
st September 
2007 Author: Stephen Barnard, Head of Clinical Governance 
Task 
No. Task Actions 
Lead 
Person 
Time 
required 
Expected  
Completion 
Date 
Costs 
educational pathways to support 
development.  A timetable for 
delivery of the educational 
programmes should also be 
developed. 
 
4. Identification of costs to deliver required education 
and training.  
5. Develop timetable for delivery of education. 
6. Production of a report. 
4. 
Development of a business case, 
for submission to the Trust Board 
following completion of tasks 1, 2 
and 3. This should outline 
associated costs, timescales, 
benefits, risks and measures of 
success.  
 
1. Production of business case providing an options 
appraisal of tasks 1 to 3. 
2. Full costings for each option produced. 
3. Risk assessment of each option completed. 
4. Presentation of the business case to the Trust 
Executive Team. 
5. Presentation of the business case to the 
commissioners to agree funding support.    
 
 
Deputy 
Chief 
Executive 
2 months 1st May 2008 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
 
Costs of options not yet 
known. 
5. 
Implementation of the new 
operational management and staff 
structures. 
1. Establishment of a working group. 
2. Development of a project plan. 
3. Implementation of plan. 
Deputy 
Chief 
Executive 
12 months 1st May 2009 Not yet known 
6. 
Purchase and implementation of an 
electronic incident reporting 
system. 
 
1. Evaluation of available systems. 
2. Identification of preferred system. 
3. Production of a business case to support purchase. 
4. Presentation to Trust Executive Team. 
5. Undertake tender process. 
6. Purchase of system 
7. Implementation of system and training of users.  
Head of 
Risk and 
Safety 
6 months 1
st February 
2008 
£ 15,000 revenue 
(10 x £1500 administrator 
licenses) 
 
£2000 non-revenue  
(10 x train the trainer places) 
7. 
Development of a Trust 
Organisational Learning Strategy 
and Policy. 
1. Establish a working group. 
2. Review of current national guidance and best 
evidence. 
3. Development of draft for consultation. 
4. Finalised draft to Trust Executive Team for 
approval. 
5. Approval at Trust Board. 
6. Development and implementation of an action plan. 
7. Communication of strategy and policy to all staff.   
Head of 
Clinical 
Governance 
12 months 
1st 
September 
2008 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
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Action Plan Updated: 1
st September 
2007 Author: Stephen Barnard, Head of Clinical Governance 
Task 
No. Task Actions 
Lead 
Person 
Time 
required 
Expected  
Completion 
Date 
Costs 
8. 
The Trust should review its current 
Untoward Incident Policy to support 
the sharing of learning outcomes at 
the end of the review process. 
1. Presentation of policy at Clinical Governance Sub-
committee for review.  
2. Consultation with staff. 
3. Re-presentation of policy at Clinical Governance 
Sub-committee for approval. 
4. Presentation to Trust Board for approval. 
5. Communication of policy amendments to 
organisation. 
Head of 
Clinical 
Governance 
6 months 1
st February 
2008 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
9. The Trust should implement a simplified near miss form 
1. Identification of information required on near miss 
form. 
2. Design of form. 
3. Amendment of Trust Incident Reporting procedures 
to support use of form.  
4. Consultation with staff. 
5. Get quote for printing of form. 
6. Presentation of amended procedures and form to 
the Trust Risk Management Sub-committee for 
approval. 
7. Identification of funding from existing printing 
budget. 
8. Ordering of forms and implementation. 
9. Communication of new guidance to all staff and 
mangers. 
Head of 
Risk and 
Safety 
2 months 
1st 
November 
2007 
£1000 revenue  
(printing of 3000 forms per 
year) 
10. 
An Incident Review Forum should 
be developed, using the principles 
of communities of practice, to 
collectively develop learning and 
knowledge from adverse incidents, 
complaints and claims. 
1. Identification of appropriate membership for the 
forum. 
2. Production of draft Terms of Reference. 
3. Approval of the forum at the Clinical Governance 
Sub-committee. 
4. Advertise for staff members to attend the forum.  
5. Hold first meeting and agree Terms of Reference. 
Medical 
Director 3 months 
1st 
December 
£2400 revenue 
(pay costs for 6 operational 
staff to attend quarterly 
meetings for half a day) 
11. 
The Trust should review the 
Knowledge and Skills Framework 
process to ensure that adverse 
incident information is considered 
as part of the appraisal process. 
1. Presentation of policy at Clinical Governance Sub-
committee for review.  
2. Consultation with staff. 
3. Re-presentation of policy at Clinical Governance 
Sub-committee for approval. 
Assistant 
Director of 
Workforce 
develop-
ment 
6 months 1
st February 
2008 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
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Action Plan Updated: 1
st September 
2007 Author: Stephen Barnard, Head of Clinical Governance 
Task 
No. Task Actions 
Lead 
Person 
Time 
required 
Expected  
Completion 
Date 
Costs 
4. Presentation to Trust Board for approval. 
5. Communication of policy amendments to staff and 
managers. 
12. 
The Trust should undertake an 
audit of current availability to IT 
equipment for operational staff, 
including the provision of work 
email addresses for staff. The audit 
should also assess the number of 
staff who require computer training. 
 
1. Audit to be undertaken by IM&T department. 
2. Report presented, including a proposed action plan 
and any identified costs to the Area Management 
Team for consideration. 
Head of 
IM&T 2 months 
1st 
November 
2007 
Nil costs – management 
time only. 
 
Cost of additional resources 
not yet known. 
13. 
A Quality Improvement Portal 
should be developed on the Trust 
Intranet site to support the sharing 
of and development of information 
between staff. 
1. Development of a product specification. 
2. Consult with staff and managers as to what would 
be beneficial. 
3. Development of a small project group. 
4. Development of a project plan. 
5. Design and development of the portal. 
6. Testing of functionality of portal. 
7. Promotion of launch of portal. 
Head of 
Health 
Informatics 
7 months 1
st March 
2008 
All development undertaken 
by in-house staff therefore 
no costs. 
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APPENDIX 1: SELF-COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear colleague 
 
My name is Steve Barnard, Head of Governance for the Greater Manchester Area. I 
am currently undertaking a research project as part of a Masters in Managing 
Health and Social Care. The research project is to investigate the organisation’s 
effectiveness at knowledge management and learning, from adverse incidents; 
using a conceptual framework that I have developed. 
 
As part of my research I have chosen to produce and distribute a questionnaire for 
staff and managers to complete. 
 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could spare a short amount of your time to 
complete the attached questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaire is completely anonymous and confidential. Nobody will be 
able to identify your individual responses. 
 
The questionnaire is made up of a series of statements with a 4 point answer scale 
ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly or the option of yes or no. 
 
Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that most accurately 
reflects your personal view.  If you change your mind then place a cross through the 
first circled answer and then re-circle your revised answer. Some questions or 
statements may ask you to provide some additional information depending on your 
answer. Space will be provided directly under the question or statement. If you are 
completing it electronically then please place an X in the box that represents your 
answer. The questionnaire should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Once you have completed the questionnaire please return it by one of the following 
methods: 
 
1. Place it within the designated folder provided on station.  
2. If you have received it via email then you can return it to the email address 
below. 
3. Return it via internal post to: 
 
Steve Barnard 
Head of Governance 
Healthcare Governance Department 
Greater Manchester Area Office 
Whitefield Ambulance Station 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire no later than the 15th May 2007.  
 
Many thanks for your assistance and for taking the time to complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
If you have any questions or require assistance please contact me on 0161 796 
7222 or 07780 668427 or steve.barnard@nwas.nhs.uk. 
 
Kind Regards 
Steve Barnard 
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1. Human Resource Practices 
 
Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that most accurately reflects 
your personal view.  If you change your mind then place a cross through the first circled 
answer and then re-circle your revised answer. 
  Yes No 
a)  I know what an adverse incident is. 1 2 
b)  I know how to report an adverse incident. 1 2 
c)  I know what information is required for documenting and reporting an adverse incident. 1 2 
 
  Agree 
strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
d)  
Human resource policies and 
procedures encourage staff to be 
open and honest when reporting 
adverse incidents. 
1 2 3 4 
e)  There are incentives to develop and share new knowledge or learning. 1 2 3 4 
If you agree strongly or agree, please 
provide examples of the incentives:  
f)  
The Trust actively encourages staff 
to learn and develop new 
knowledge. 
1 2 3 4 
g)  
I have learned and developed new 
knowledge as a result of an adverse 
incident. 
1 2 3 4 
If you agree strongly or agree, please 
provide an example:  
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h)  
The Trust has an appraisal system 
that measures individual 
performance and encourages 
learning and the development of 
new skills or knowledge. 
1 2 3 4 
 
2. Culture 
 
  Agree 
strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  
I would feel confident reporting an 
adverse incident that involved myself 
or another member of staff to my line 
manager. 
1 2 3 4 
b)  
The Trust supports an open and fair 
culture, including the reporting of 
adverse incidents, through policies, 
procedures and standards. 
1 2 3 4 
c)  The Trust has an open and fair culture. 1 2 3 4 
d)  I am encouraged to report all adverse incidents. 1 2 3 4 
e)  Learning is encouraged from adverse incidents at an individual level. 1 2 3 4 
f)  
The Trust encourages staff to be 
innovative and suggests new ideas or 
ways of working. 
1 2 3 4 
g)  
The Trust has a culture that supports 
staff to work and learn together to 
develop new knowledge. 
1 2 3 4 
h)  
The Trust is committed to taking 
action to improve organisational 
performance as a result of adverse 
incidents. 
1 2 3 4 
i)  The Trust has a culture of blame and punishment. 1 2 3 4 
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3. Structure 
 
  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  The management structure supports the reporting of adverse incidents. 1 2 3 4 
b)  The management structure supports an open and fair culture. 1 2 3 4 
c)  The management structure supports sharing of information:     
 From operational level to management 1 2 3 4 
 From management to operational level 1 2 3 4 
 Between operational staff. 1 2 3 4 
d)  The structure supports team working to share learning and knowledge. 1 2 3 4 
e)  
The structure provides informal 
opportunities (such as protected time 
or breaks) to share and discuss 
information with other staff. 
1 2 3 4 
 If you agree strongly or agree, please provide examples of opportunities:  
f)  
The structure provides formal 
opportunities (such as team meetings, 
forums etc) to share and discuss 
information with other staff. 
1 2 3 4 
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  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
 If you agree strongly or agree, please provide examples of opportunities:  
g)  
The structure supports networking 
across organisational boundaries, 
internally and externally. 
1 2 3 4 
h)  
The organisation’s structure is flexible 
and organic and can be shaped to 
meet changing needs. 
1 2 3 4 
i)  
The organisation’s structure is fixed 
and bureaucratic and is difficult to 
change to meet changing needs. 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
4. Leadership 
 
  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  Managers are viewed as leaders within the Trust. 1 2 3 4 
b)  Managers communicate a clear vision of the organisation’s aims. 1 2 3 4 
c)  
Managers within the Trust are 
inclusive of staff when considering 
organisational change or ways to 
improve organisational performance. 
1 2 3 4 
d)  Managers act in a democratic manner when managing staff. 1 2 3 4 
e)  Managers are authoritarian when managing staff. 1 2 3 4 
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f)  
Managers act with empathy and 
support when managing adverse 
incidents. 
1 2 3 4 
g)  
Staff are acknowledged for 
contributing to organisational learning 
or knowledge development. 
1 2 3 4 
h)  Staff are encouraged to reflect on adverse incidents. 1 2 3 4 
 
 
5. Information Systems 
 
  Agree 
strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  
The Trust has effective information 
systems for the management of 
adverse incidents (reporting through 
to; action, learning and feedback). 
1 2 3 4 
b)  
The Trust has efficient systems for the 
reporting and recording of adverse 
incidents.  
1 2 3 4 
c)  I regularly have access to a computer in the workplace. 1 2 3 4 
d)  
I have access to email at work and 
regularly use it to communicate with 
other staff. 
1 2 3 4 
e)  
The Trust provides a communication 
network for staff to share learning, 
knowledge or ideas.  
1 2 3 4 
f)  
The Trust provides 
systems/technology that allows staff 
to search and retrieve stored 
knowledge or information. 
1 2 3 4 
g)  
The Trust provides 
systems/technology that allows staff 
to formally record new knowledge or 
ideas 
1 2 3 4 
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6. Communities of Practice 
 
Communities of practice can be described as “groups of people…with shared 
expertise…who share knowledge in free-flowing, creative ways that foster new approaches 
to problems.” (Wenger and Snyder 2000 p3).  Hildreth and Kimble (2002) also identify 
these as groups where such types of knowledge are nurtured, shared and sustained. 
 
  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  
The Trust supports the interaction of 
individual and organisation to share 
and build knowledge. 
1 2 3 4 
b)  
The Trust has established forums or 
groups that are designed to share 
knowledge and learning. 
1 2 3 4 
 
If you agree strongly or agree, please 
provide examples of the groups or 
forums: 
 
c)  Managers encourage staff to attend forums or groups. 1 2 3 4 
d)  Managers provide support for staff to attend forums or groups. 1 2 3 4 
e)  
Staff are confident to discuss issues 
or new knowledge in an open manner 
within the forums or groups. 
1 2 3 4 
f)  
Staff are encouraged to use the 
concepts of enquiry, reflection and 
experience within these forums or 
groups. 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
7. Action and feedback  
 
  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
a)  I am aware of changes made by the Trust as a result of adverse incidents. 1 2 3 4 
b)  
Staff are regularly provided with 
individual feedback in relation to 
adverse incidents. 
1 2 3 4 
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  Agree strongly Agree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
c)  
Feedback from adverse incidents is 
used as part of the Trust appraisal 
system. 
1 2 3 4 
d)  
The organisation considers 
information from adverse incidents 
when developing new services, 
policies or procedures. 
1 2 3 4 
e)  
The organisation communicates what 
learning or changes have occurred as 
a result of adverse incidents. 
1 2 3 4 
 If you agree strongly or agree, please provide examples of communication:  
f)  
The risk of adverse incidents recurring 
has been reduced due to the 
organisation’s ability to learn and 
implement change. 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
8. About you 
 
a)  Gender Male / Female 
   
b)  Number of years you have worked for the organisation  
  
c)  Occupational Group (Please tick only one of the following) 
   
 Care Assistant  
 Ambulance Technician  
 Paramedic  
 Emergency Care Practitioner (equivalent)  
 Ambulance Control Staff  
   
 Clinical Practice Supervisor/Trainer  
 Paramedic Emergency Service Manager  
 Patient Transport Service Manager  
 Paramedic Emergency Control Manager  
 Training Manager  
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 Administrative & Clerical  
 Support Service staff  
 Support Service Manager  
 Senior Manager (‘Head of’)  
 Executive  
 
 
Please provide details of where you work (i.e. Operational Group, HR, IMT): 
 
 
 
 
 
Please place any additional comments/information in relation to any part of the 
questionnaire in the box below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part of the research also involves speaking to some staff directly, to further explore 
their understanding. If you would like to take part in this additional research please 
provide your details below. It is anticipated that this part of the research will require no 
more than one hour of your time. If you do not wish to participate in this part of the 
research then please leave blank. 
 
Name:   
Workplace:   
Contact Telephone 
Number: 
 
 
Email address:   
 
 
 
Many thanks for time and assistance.
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Culture  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
    
Objective 1: 
The organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and 
record adverse incidents 
 
C1.1 How would you 
describe the culture in 
relation to staff recognising 
the importance of reporting 
adverse incidents within 
Greater Manchester? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Objective 2:  
Development of new 
knowledge and learning 
from information within the 
organisation 
 
C2.1 How would you 
describe the culture in 
relation to learning and 
developing new 
knowledge from adverse 
incidents? 
 
C2.2 Does the culture 
support the sharing of 
knowledge? 
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Culture  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
Objective 3: 
The organisation’s 
implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational 
performance. 
 
C3.1 Can you describe the 
Trust’s culture with regard 
to taking action or making 
improvements following 
adverse incidents? 
 
 
   
 
Leadership  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
    
Objective 1: 
The organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and 
record adverse incidents 
 
L1.1 Can you discuss how 
managers are perceived 
within the Trust; in relation 
to them acting as leaders 
to support an open and fair 
culture? 
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Leadership  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
Objective 2:  
Development of new 
knowledge and learning 
from information within the 
organisation 
 
L2.1 Can you discuss how 
managers support learning 
and knowledge 
development from adverse 
incidents?  
 
L2.2 Can you discuss how 
managers involve staff to 
suggest new ways of 
working? 
 
L2.3 How do managers 
support the sharing of 
knowledge? 
 
 
 
 
   
Objective 3: 
The organisation’s 
implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational 
performance. 
 
L3.1Can you discuss how 
committed managers and 
staff are to making 
changes or improvements 
as a result of adverse 
incidents? 
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Leadership  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
L3.2 Can you discuss how 
staff are acknowledged or 
thanked when they make 
contributions to improving 
organisational 
performance? 
 
 
Structure  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
    
Objective 1: 
The organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and 
record adverse incidents 
 
S1.1 How would you 
describe the management 
structure in the GM area? 
 
S1.2 Can you discuss how 
the structure supports the 
reporting of adverse 
incidents? 
 
Consider: 
Operational to 
management, 
management to 
operational and between 
operational staff. 
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Structure  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
Objective 2:  
Development of new 
knowledge and learning 
from information within the 
organisation 
 
S2.1 How effective is the 
structure at supporting, 
interaction, team working 
and networking to enable 
learning and knowledge 
sharing and development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Objective 3: 
The organisation’s 
implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational 
performance. 
 
S3.1 How effective is the 
GM area management 
structure at supporting the 
implementation of new 
ways of working/change or 
learning from adverse 
incidents? 
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Human Resource  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
    
Objective 1: 
The organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and 
record adverse incidents 
 
HR1.1 Can you discuss 
how HR systems support 
the identification and 
reporting or adverse 
incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Objective 3: 
The organisation’s 
implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational 
performance. 
 
HR3.1 How effective 
would you say the HR 
systems are at 
encouraging individuals to 
develop new skills or 
knowledge? 
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Info Systems  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
    
Objective 1: 
The organisation’s ability 
to recognise, identify and 
record adverse incidents 
 
IS1.1 Can you discuss 
how effective the incident 
reporting system is for 
identifying and recording 
adverse events? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Objective 2:  
Development of new 
knowledge and learning 
from information within the 
organisation 
 
IS1.1 Can you describe 
the types of information 
systems you use to share 
information, learning or 
knowledge with others? 
 
IS2.2 Can you discuss 
your experience of how 
information is used from 
adverse events to develop 
knowledge or learning? 
 
 
 
   
153 
Info Systems  What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
Objective 3: 
The organisation’s 
implementation of new 
learning and knowledge to 
improve organisational 
performance. 
 
IS3.1 Can you discuss 
your 
experience/knowledge of 
how information systems 
support the 
implementation of new 
knowledge i.e. its 
documentation and 
communication to staff? 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Communities of 
Practice 
 What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
Objective 2:  
Development of new 
knowledge and learning 
from information within the 
organisation 
 
CP2.1 Can you discuss 
how the organisation 
supports the interaction of 
individuals to share and 
build knowledge? 
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Communities of 
Practice 
 What would you say are the positives and negatives in relation to…? 
 Awareness Positives Negatives 
CP2.2 What opportunities 
exist – in relation to 
adverse incidents or other 
areas - for staff to share 
and develop knowledge? 
 
CP2.3 How would you 
describe the level of 
support that is provided by 
managers for staff to be 
part of knowledge sharing 
activities? 
 
CP2.4 Are staff 
encouraged to use 
concepts of enquiry, 
reflection and experience 
when sharing and 
developing knowledge?  
 
CP2.5 How effective is the 
organisation at developing 
new knowledge from 
networks or groups of staff 
in this context? 
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